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IN DEFENSE OF THE SUBSTANCE–PROCEDURE 
DICHOTOMY 
JENNIFER S. HENDRICKS

 
ABSTRACT 
John Hart Ely famously observed, “We were all brought up on 
sophisticated talk about the fluidity of the line between substance and 
procedure,” but for most of Erie’s history, the Supreme Court has 
answered the question “Does this state law govern in federal court?” with 
a “yes” or a “no.” Beginning, however, with Gasperini v. Center for 
Humanities, and continuing with Semtek v. Lockheed Martin and the 
dissenting opinion in Shady Grove v. Allstate, a shifting coalition of 
justices has pursued a third path. Instead of declaring state law applicable 
or inapplicable, they have claimed for themselves the prerogative to 
fashion law that purportedly accommodates the interests of both 
sovereigns. With the cover of an intellectual critique of the substance–
procedure dichotomy, the Court has thus embarked on a new phase of Erie 
doctrine, a phase that replaces “yes” or “no” with “Let’s see what we 
can work out.” 
This Article adds a new level of critique to the chorus of criticism that 
has already been directed at these opinions. It argues that the new 
enterprise and its blurring of the substance–procedure dichotomy are 
based on a misguided aspiration to accommodate state substantive 
policies at the expense of federal procedure. 
Descriptively, in order to have a dichotomy, it is necessary to have two 
poles. This Article therefore demonstrates that the distinction between 
substance and procedure is appropriately represented by a single-
dimensional spectrum. Part of what the Court has done wrong is to ignore 
this linear relationship by insisting, for example, in Semtek, that res 
judicata is “too substantive” to be addressed in the Federal Rules yet 
procedural enough to be governed by federal common law under the Rules 
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of Decision Act. In addition, given the linearity of substance and 
procedure, one could imagine the distinction either as a dichotomy of 
black and white, with every legal rule falling into one category or the 
other, or as a spectrum of gray, with many or even most legal rules falling 
in the mushy middle. Descriptively, of course, the latter view is more 
accurate. This Article argues, however, that the Court should nevertheless 
classify each legal rule as black or white, rather than try to accommodate 
both its procedural and its substantive aspects. 
This Article offers two reasons for preferring the black–white 
approach. First, the governing statutes contemplate a dichotomy between 
substance and procedure, and the Court is not authorized to use the 
ambiguity in that distinction to replace the statutory scheme with its own 
discretionary treatment of state law. Second, returning to the black–white 
approach would promote democratic transparency in the states. 
Specifically, in addition to traditional Erie concerns about judicial 
lawmaking, Congress has set a policy of establishing a uniform body of 
transsubstantive procedural law. State legislators know this, and there is 
nothing wrong with federal courts expecting them to act accordingly. If 
they, as Representative Dingell famously offered, prefer to manipulate 
procedure in order to undermine the substantive rights they purport to 
have created, the threat of fixed procedures in diversity could and should 
restrain them. Too often, the Supreme Court treats legislative enactments 
as fixed, so that the game begins when the litigants start their forum 
shopping. The game begins earlier, in the legislature, and the nascent 
effort to accommodate state law through Erie doctrine creates the wrong 
incentives for that game. 
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In the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court has been taking legal 
realism a bit too seriously. ―We were all brought up on sophisticated talk 
about the fluidity of the line between substance and procedure,‖1 but for 
many years, when presented with a thorny problem of vertical choice of 
law, the Supreme Court hemmed and hawed about the subtleness of the 
distinction—and picked one. Ultimately, a decision had to be made; either 
the federal courts would follow a particular state law in diversity cases or 
they would not. 
In the First Phase of Erie doctrine,
2
 state law was ascendant and usually 
deemed binding.
3
 In the Second Phase, after Hanna v. Plumer,
4
 the Federal 
Rules reigned supreme, sweeping aside state laws in or near their path.
5
 
While the Supreme Court‘s decisions in both phases sometimes strained 
credulity, they did answer the question ―Does this state law govern in 
federal court?‖ with a ―yes‖ or a ―no.‖ Beginning with Gasperini v. Center 
for Humanities,
6
 however, a shifting coalition of justices has pursued a 
third path, declaring state law neither wholly applicable nor wholly 
inapplicable. Instead, these justices have claimed for themselves the 
 
 
 1. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724 (1974). 
 2. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 3. See infra Part I.A. 
 4. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 5. See infra Part I.B. An exception during this Second Phase was Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 
446 U.S. 740 (1980), which adhered to a prior Phase-One decision deferring to state law. See infra 
note 69. 
 6. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
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prerogative to fashion law that purportedly accommodates the interests of 
both sovereigns.
7
 With the cover of an intellectual critique of the 
substance–procedure dichotomy, this new approach represents a nascent 
Third Phase of Erie doctrine, which would replace ―yes‖ or ―no‖ with 
―Let‘s see what we can work out.‖ 
This new venture—so far, Gasperini, Semtek,8 and, most recently, four 
or five justices in Shady Grove
9—has been the object of ―a chorus of 
academic criticism.‖10 Most of this criticism focuses on problems of 
administrability, lack of adequate guidance to lower courts, and the 
continuing absurdity of reading a Federal Rule to mean one thing in 
federal cases and another in diversity.
11
 
This Article adds a new level of critique. It argues that the Phase-Three 
approach and its blurring of the substance–procedure dichotomy are 
inappropriate uses of federal judicial power and are based on a misguided 
aspiration to accommodate state substantive policies at the expense of 
federal procedure. This thesis includes both a descriptive and a 
prescriptive claim. 
Descriptively, in order to have a dichotomy, it is necessary to have two 
poles. This Article therefore demonstrates that the distinction between 
substance and procedure is appropriately represented by a single-
dimensional spectrum. That is, even though there are several different 
ways of making the distinction—the Rules of Decision Act (―RDA‖) 
approach,
12
 the Rules Enabling Act (―REA‖) approach,13 the inherent 
 
 
 7. See infra Part I.C. 
 8. Semtek Int‘l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001). 
 9. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Insur. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). The four 
dissenters in Shady Grove used a Phase-Three approach, id. at 1460–73, while the lead opinion, joined 
in full by four justices, used an aggressive version of the Phase-Two approach, id. at 1436–48. Justice 
Stevens joined parts of the lead opinion and wrote a separate concurrence that appeared to agree with 
the dissenters‘ approach in at least some respects, despite reaching a different conclusion, id. at 1448–
60. See also infra Part I.C.3. 
 10. Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules: An Essay On What’s 
Wrong With the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 708 (2006). 
 11. See infra Part II.A. The Supreme Court has explicitly adopted separate interpretations of Rule 
3 for diversity cases and federal question cases. See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 
337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949) (disregarding the potential applicability of Rule 3 in a diversity case); 
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 753 (1980) (adhering to Ragan); West v. Conrail, 481 
U.S. 35, 39 (1987) (holding that Rule 3 determines commencement of an action for purposes of the 
statute of limitations in a federal question case). In Semtek and Shady Grove, the Court and the 
dissenters, respectively, adopted novel interpretations of Rules 41(b) and 23, respectively, for diversity 
cases which have yet to affect how those Rules are applied in federal question cases. See infra notes 
131–32 and accompanying text. 
 12. Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). 
 13. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
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powers approach
14—the tests for these approaches can be understood as 
marking different points along the same linear continuum. With pure 
substance at one end and pure procedure at the other, all legal rules can be 
thought of as lying at some point between these two poles. Part of what the 
Court has done wrong is to ignore this linear relationship by insisting, for 
example, in Semtek, that res judicata is ―too substantive‖ to be addressed 
in the Federal Rules yet procedural enough to be governed by federal 
common law under the RDA.
15
 
Normatively, this Article defends the dichotomy between substance 
and procedure. Given the linearity of substance and procedure, one could 
imagine the distinction either as a dichotomy of black and white, with 
every legal rule falling into one category or the other, or as a spectrum of 
gray, with many or even most legal rules falling in the mushy middle. 
Descriptively, of course, the latter view is more accurate. This Article 
claims, however, that the Court should, with full awareness of the 
grayness of all things, nevertheless classify each legal rule as black or 
white, rather than try to accommodate both its procedural and its 
substantive aspects. The classification need not be the same for all 
purposes and in all contexts. The Court has good reasons for drawing the 
line between substance and procedure differently under the RDA, under 
the REA, and in other contexts.
16
 Within each context, however, a 
particular legal rule should be classified as either black or white: either 
substantive or procedural, governed by either federal or state law. 
This Article offers two reasons for preferring the black–white 
approach. First, the governing statutes contemplate a dichotomy between 
substance and procedure, and the Court is not authorized to use the 
ambiguity in that distinction to replace the statutory scheme with its own 
discretionary treatment of state law. In the face of an already delicate 
choice between state and federal law, trying to create nuanced 
accommodations between the two allows the perfect to become the enemy 
of the good. The Phase-Three approach may be feasible in the Supreme 
Court or in scholarly articles, but it does not produce good doctrine on the 
ground. 
 
 
 14. See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813 (2008) (describing 
and developing a theory for explaining the federal courts‘ inherent powers over procedure). 
 15. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 16. But see Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 877, 903–04 
(2011) (suggesting that the distinction between substance and procedure should not vary across 
contexts). 
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Second, eschewing Phase Three and returning to the black–white 
approach would promote democratic transparency in the states. 
Specifically, in addition to traditional Erie concerns about judicial 
lawmaking, Congress has set a policy of establishing a uniform body of 
transsubstantive procedural law.
17
 State lawmakers know this, and there is 
nothing wrong with federal courts expecting them to act accordingly. If 
they, as Representative Dingell famously offered,
18
 prefer to manipulate 
procedure in order to undermine the substantive rights they purport to have 
created, the threat of fixed procedures in diversity could and should 
restrain them. Too often, the Supreme Court treats legislative enactments 
as fixed, so that the game begins when the litigants start their forum 
shopping. The game begins earlier, in the legislature, and the ad hoc, 
accommodating approach to state law in Erie‘s Third Phase creates the 
wrong incentives for that game. 
Part I of this Article describes Erie‘s three phases and identifies a key 
characteristic of each phase‘s treatment of the relationship between state 
law and the Federal Rules. For those readers fortunate enough to have 
escaped law school before the Phase-Three approach emerged, Part I.C 
describes Gasperini, Semtek, and Shady Grove in detail. Part I shows that 
while the First Phase was characterized by deference to state policy and 
the Second Phase by the ascendency of the Federal Rules, the nascent 
Third Phase is characterized by judicial discretion in formulating the law 
that controls in diversity cases. Part II.A argues that courts lack authority 
for exercising this discretion: the Phase-Three approach presents itself as 
creative problem solving that crafts accommodations to serve state and 
federal interests; the proper role of the courts in this context is more 
limited. Part II.B argues that the Phase-Three approach also undermines 
separation of powers principles at the state level. The justices using this 
approach have justified it by the purported need to vindicate state policy 
choices. However, state-level democracy would be better served by 
forcing state lawmakers to enact their policy choices into substantive law, 
rather than allowing them to manipulate outcomes through procedure.
19
 
 
 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 237–40. Of course, Congress itself retains the prerogative 
to adopt special procedures in particular substantive contexts. This prerogative troubles some scholars, 
see infra Part II.C.2, but its resolution is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 18. ―I‘ll let you write the substance . . . you let me write the procedure, and I‘ll screw you every 
time.‖ Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and 
Governmental Regulations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of 
Rep. John Dingell). 
 19. As noted throughout the discussion supra, ―substance‖ and ―procedure‖ are fluid categories 
and are inextricably intertwined. They are, nonetheless, ―the terms the Enabling Act uses,‖ Ely, supra 
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One way to encourage them to do so is to adhere to a uniform system of 
federal procedure, rather than modifying procedure on an ad hoc basis as 
the Court did in Gasperini and Semtek. Thus, the justification for the 
Phase-Three approach in Gasperini and Semtek—the need to protect state 
lawmaking prerogatives—is misguided. Part III offers suggestions for 
minimizing the damage of Gasperini and Semtek: confining them to their 
facts and returning to the conceptual structure of Phase Two. 
I. THE THREE PHASES OF ERIE 
Vertical choice-of-law doctrine has developed in three stages since 
Erie was decided. In Phase One, the Supreme Court held that most state 
laws it encountered were ―substantive‖ for purposes of the RDA.20 The 
Court adopted a posture of deference, holding state law to be applicable in 
federal court even to the point of neglecting or downplaying the force of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The result was a broad 
understanding of what made a legal rule ―substantive,‖ focused on whether 
a discrepancy in that legal rule would affect a litigant‘s ex ante choice of 
forum. 
In Phase Two, the Court reversed course, holding that most things were 
not only procedural but also already covered by federal law.
21
 It construed 
the Federal Rules more broadly to displace state law and adhered to a 
generous test for the permissible scope of the Rules. While the Federal 
Rules had fared poorly in Phase One, state law fared poorly in Phase Two. 
In both of these phases, however, the Court honored the need to choose: 
state law either did or did not apply. 
The Phase-Three approach strikes out in a new direction.
22
 It began, in 
Gasperini, with the long-acknowledged observation that substance and 
procedure are inextricably intertwined.
23
 A law that on its face regulates 
procedure may be intended to serve a substantive policy. In Phases One 
and Two, this reality meant that the decision whether to apply state law 
was often difficult. In Phase Three, the justices using the new approach 
 
 
note 1, at 724, and the existence of dawn and dusk does not negate the difference between night and 
day. The question is what to do when the cases of dawn and dusk arise. This Article proposes that we 
judge the Federal Rules according to the terms of the REA and call that realm of federal law 
―procedural‖ and thus applicable in diversity cases. Everything else is, in this context, ―substantive,‖ 
which leaves plenty of room for state lawmakers to carry out their policies. This Article is agnostic on 
whether the current approach to assessing the validity of the Rules under the REA is adequate. 
 20. See infra Part I.A. 
 21. See infra Part I.B. 
 22. See infra Part I.C. 
 23. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996). 
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have taken the initiative to craft compromises that accommodate state 
policy while retaining federal control. The nascent Third Phase is thus 
characterized by the federal courts exercising discretionary authority over 
whether and how to accommodate what they perceive to be substantive 
policy preferences expressed in state procedural law. Proffered in the 
name of protecting the states‘ substantive policies, the Phase-Three 
approach paradoxically results in power over substantive law flowing to 
the federal courts. 
A. Phase One: Deference to the States 
The Supreme Court held in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
24
 that the Rules 
of Decision Act requires a federal court sitting in diversity
25
 to apply the 
substantive law of the state in which it sits.
26
 In the standard telling of the 
story, the reasons for this decision were both jurisprudential and political. 
Jurisprudentially, legal realism and positivism had swept aside belief in a 
single, universal common law that could be discovered by state and 
federal courts alike.
27
 Politically, the old guard in the federal courts was 
adhering to common law doctrines—especially doctrines that hindered tort 
plaintiffs—that in state courts were giving way to the demands of new 
social realities in the wake of the industrial revolution.
28
 The Erie doctrine 
 
 
 24. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 25. State substantive law may apply in federal court in contexts other than diversity jurisdiction, 
such as when a state law claim is litigated under the supplemental jurisdiction granted by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367 (2006). For the sake of convenience, this Article follows the common practice of referring to 
Erie questions as arising primarily in diversity cases. 
 26. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. More precisely, federal courts must follow state law ―rules of decision,‖ 
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006), a requirement that in retrospect has been understood as drawing a distinction 
that maps, at least approximately, onto the concepts of ―substance‖ and ―procedure.‖ Before Erie, 
federal courts sitting in diversity routinely applied state statutes and state common-law rules that were 
understood to be ―local,‖ but under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), federal courts 
followed their own lights on questions of general common law. 
 27. See HOWARD FINK & MARK TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 190 
(2d ed. 1987); Edward A. Purcell, The Story of Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics, and 
Social Change Reshape Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES at 23–24 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004) 
(describing the pre-Erie ―declaratory‖ theory of law). 
 28. See Purcell, supra note 27, at 25 (―[Before Erie], the federal courts were becoming identified 
with the new national economy and the protection of corporate rights, and their ‗general‘ law decisions 
spread from commercial issues into most common-law fields and seemed to grow ever more favorable 
to corporate interests.‖); JoEllen Lind, “Procedural Swift”: Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort 
Law, and Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717, 732 (2004) (―According to some commentators, 
Swift [v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842),] secured the federal courts as ‗business courts‘ used by corporations 
to resist the claims of workers seeking redress for injuries.‖); Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie 
Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 245, 248 (2008) [hereinafter Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine?] (―Justice Brandeis‘ 
ruling in Erie restrained a pro-corporate federal judiciary by eliminating its power to create substantive 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/3
  
 
 
 
 
2011] SUBSTANCE–PROCEDURE DICHOTOMY 111 
 
 
 
 
restricted the power of the federal diversity courts over substantive law, 
confining them to the task of providing an alternative forum for enforcing 
legal rights that are created and defined by the states. 
Justice Reed, concurring in Erie, was the first to anticipate what would 
become the central meaning of Erie to future generations: the distinction 
between substance and procedure. He observed, ―The line between 
procedural and substantive law is hazy but no one doubts federal power 
over procedure.‖29 Consistent with this point, Erie‘s First Phase was 
devoted primarily to developing a menu of tests for distinguishing 
substance from procedure under the RDA.
30
 When a litigant proposes that 
a particular state law should govern in a diversity action, and no federal 
law or Rule supersedes the state law, federal courts ask whether the matter 
is outcome determinative in the run of cases,
31
 a test which was later 
refined to focus on the ―twin aims‖ of Erie: avoiding inequitable outcomes 
and discouraging forum shopping.
32
 If the matter is outcome determinative 
in this sense, then state law should apply.
33
 Depending on the 
circumstances, courts may also balance state interests and Erie concerns 
 
 
rules of federal common law, which had operated to displace state rules that were often less favorable 
to corporate litigants.‖). Given this historical context, it was ironic and perhaps politically convenient 
for the Court that in Erie itself state law favored the corporate defendant. A similar reversal of typical 
interests occurred in Shady Grove and may partly explain the alignment of liberal and conservative 
justices in that case. See Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules 
Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1179 [hereinafter Steinman, Our 
Class Action Federalism] (2011) (arguing that the justices in Shady Grove may have been looking 
ahead to more typical cases, where defendants prefer the application of federal class action law and 
plaintiffs prefer state law). 
 29. Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result) (citation 
omitted).  
 30. The Court at times refused to describe the distinction as one between substance and 
procedure, perhaps wishing to retain those terms for marking the bounds of the REA. See Guaranty 
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (―It is . . . immaterial whether statutes of limitations are 
characterized either as ‗substantive‘ or ‗procedural‘ in State court opinions in any use of those terms 
unrelated to the specific issue before us.‖). This Article refers to both the REA and the RDA—and, for 
that matter, the powers of Congress and the courts to regulate judicial proceedings—as distinguishing 
between ―substance‖ and ―procedure,‖ while recognizing that the dividing line is in a different place 
under each regime. I will usually refer to matters as being either substantive or procedural for purposes 
of the REA [or the RDA, or inherent powers, or whatever]. For readers who prefer a more prominent 
reminder that these labels are conclusory rather than inherent in the matters discussed, I suggest 
globally replacing ―substance‖ and ―procedure‖ with more clearly arbitrary terms, such as ―salt‖ and 
―pepper,‖ or perhaps ―matters governed by state law‖ and ―matters governed by federal law.‖ 
 31. Scholars have offered several formulations for determining when a rule of law is outcome-
determinative in a meaningful sense, rather than in the trivial sense that a litigant who refuses to follow 
technical rules about, say, paper size will surely lose. See, e.g., Tidmarsh, supra note 16, at 908 
(proposing an ex ante valuation approach). 
 32. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466–68 (1965). 
 33. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470. 
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against other federal interests that may favor the application of federal 
law.
34
 
Although Justice Reed‘s comment in Erie could be read as implicitly 
insisting that the brand-new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure not be 
disregarded in diversity cases, the pattern that emerged was one of 
avoiding or neglecting the Rules in cases that came to the Court as ―Erie 
cases.‖ For the next three decades, the Court often bent over backwards to 
apply state law, holding that state law governed even such plausibly 
procedural matters as statutes of limitations, enforcement of arbitration 
clauses, and bond requirements.
35
 For example, the Court showed great 
deference to the states in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse 
Company.
36
 The question in Ragan was whether the plaintiff had satisfied 
the statute of limitations by filing the complaint in federal court.
37
 
According to Federal Rule 3, an action is ―commenced‖ as soon as it is 
filed, which would seem to indicate that any limitations period stops 
running.
38
 State law, however, provided that an action was not 
―commenced‖ until the summons had been served.39 The Supreme Court 
 
 
 34. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958). Byrd was the only major 
Phase-One case in the RDA line that refused to follow state law, concluding that federal practice, 
rather than state, determined the division of responsibility between judge and jury in federal court. Id. 
at 538–39. Byrd involved the potential applicability of the Seventh Amendment rather than a Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure. Id. at 539. Although the Court did not reach the question whether the Seventh 
Amendment required the outcome, the Court made plain that it reasoned in the shadow of the Seventh 
Amendment by introducing the concept of ―countervailing federal interests‖ into the Erie analysis. Id. 
at 537 (―[T]here are affirmative countervailing interests at work here.‖). Confronted with a potential 
constitutional command, the Court at last remembered that federal law is supreme; in this sense, Byrd 
can be seen as a forerunner of the Second Phase.  
 Scholars disagree about the continuing viability of Byrd. Some point out that the Supreme Court 
has rarely cited it and has not expressly followed its framework. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not 
Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court is Doing a Halfway Decent 
Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 987 (1998) (criticizing scholars 
who treat Byrd as the dominant framework). Others argue that despite the lack of explicit citation, 
Byrd‘s conceptual structure has influenced the Court‘s analysis in many cases and that it remains the 
best framework for approaching Erie questions. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of 
Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 987 (2011); Richard D. Freer & Thomas C. Arthur, The 
Irrepressible Influence of Byrd, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 61 (2011). 
 35. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Amer., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (arbitration); Cohen v. 
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (bond requirement); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer 
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (action needed to toll statute of limitations by initiating 
litigation); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (length of statute of limitation). 
 36. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 530. Relying heavily on stare decisis, the Court reaffirmed the outcome 
of Ragan in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749, 750–51 (1980) (stating that Rule 3‘s 
definition of ―commencement‖ was relevant to internal court processes rather than to the statute of 
limitations). 
 37. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531. 
 38. FED. R. CIV. P. 3. 
 39. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531 & n.4 (describing state law). 
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acknowledged that federal courts treated Rule 3 as authoritative on this 
question.
40
 Indeed, even after Ragan, Rule 3 continued to be understood as 
defining commencement for statute of limitations purposes in federal 
question cases.
41
 In diversity cases, however, Ragan held that local law 
must govern.
42
 This holding was characteristic of the First Phase, in which 
the Court found that almost all law was ―substantive‖ and thus controlled 
by the states, even to the point of disregarding a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure.
43
 
B. Phase Two: The Imperial Rules 
By apt coincidence, Erie was decided in 1938, the same year the 
Supreme Court first promulgated uniform, transsubstantive Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure for use in federal courts, pursuant to the Rules Enabling 
Act of 1934.
44
 Alongside the developing Erie doctrine distinguishing 
substance from procedure under the RDA, a separate line of cases 
addressed the validity of particular Federal Rules under the mandate of the 
REA that the Rules govern ―procedure‖ and do not ―abridge, enlarge, or 
modify any substantive right.‖45 The REA cases—most notably Sibbach v. 
Wilson & Company
46—adopted a broader understanding of the procedure 
category: to this day, anything that ―really regulates procedure‖ remains 
valid territory for the Federal Rules.
47
 
 
 
 40. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 532–33 (citing Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1947)). This 
interpretation of Rule 3 was confirmed in West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987) (―[W]e now hold 
that when the underlying cause of action is based on federal law and the absence of an express federal 
statute of limitations makes it necessary to borrow a limitations period from another statute, the action 
is not barred if it has been ‗commenced‘ in compliance with Rule 3 within the borrowed period.‖). 
 41. See West, 481 U.S. at 39. 
 42. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 533. 
 43. See Scalise v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 47 F.R.D. 148, 150 (D. Del. 1969) (―Ragan seemed to 
assert the supremacy of local law over Federal Rules in diversity cases whenever local law would have 
barred the action had it been brought in a state court.‖). The dual-interpretation problem can be elided 
by treating the ―federal‖ version of each Federal Rule as a judicial gloss akin to common lawmaking. 
If that gloss is ―substantive‖ for RDA purposes, it must give way to a ―state‖ version of the Federal 
Rule in diversity cases. See Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine?, supra note 28, at 282–87. However, 
this is not how the Supreme Court has framed its analysis in the dual-interpretation cases. See 
Clermont, supra note 34 (manuscript at 135) (stating that Shady Grove contradicted the predictions of 
this theory); Posting of Adam Steinman, adam.steinman@shu.edu, to CIV-PRO@LISTSERV.ND 
.EDU (Apr. 3, 2010) (on file with author). 
 44. Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)).  
 45. 28 U.S.C. § 2072. 
 46. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
 47. See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 1; see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Insur. Co., 
130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010) (affirming that ―really regulates procedure‖ remains the test under the 
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During Phase One, the Supreme Court generally treated RDA/Erie 
cases separately from REA cases. In Sibbach, for example, a possible 
collision between the two statutes was avoided by the plaintiff‘s 
concession that the matter was ―procedural.‖48 By such avoidance, the 
Phase-One deference to state law in Erie cases was able to co-exist with 
Sibbach‘s deferential posture toward the Rules. 
Sibbach and the REA collided with Erie and the RDA in Hanna v. 
Plumer,
49
 which marks the beginning of Erie‘s Second Phase. Hanna 
recognized that if valid, controlling federal law dictated a result, that law 
superseded any state law under both the Supremacy Clause and the 
language of the RDA.
50
 Unlike Ragan, Hanna implicitly recognized that 
the Federal Rules are federal laws like any other. They thus control 
whenever they validly apply.
51
 
In Hanna, this issue played out in the context of service of process. 
State law required personal service on the defendant, while Federal Rule 4 
offered options for substituted service.
52
 Under cases like Ragan, the 
defendant had a plausible argument that the mode of service constituted 
substantive state policy to which the federal court should defer.
53
 Rule 4, 
however, was valid under the ―really regulates procedure‖ standard from 
 
 
REA); Clermont, supra note 34 (manuscript at 132) (arguing that eight justices assented to this 
conclusion in Shady Grove). 
 48. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10–11. 
 49. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 50. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472–74. The RDA explicitly exempts instances in which ―the 
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress‖ apply and prevent the application of 
state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). Even without that caveat in the RDA, valid and applicable federal 
law would preempt state law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. 
 51. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473–74 (―To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease 
to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either 
the Constitution‘s grant of power over federal procedure or Congress‘ attempt to exercise that power in 
the Enabling Act.‖). 
 52. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461–62 (describing the differences between state and federal 
requirements). Commentators have pointed out that the perceived incompatibility between state and 
federal law could have been avoided. State law, like federal law, allowed substituted service to initiate 
the case but required personal service to toll the statute of limitations. Hanna thus appears inconsistent 
with Ragan not only as a matter of theoretical approach but also in producing an irreconcilable 
outcome. Cf. supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 53. See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949) (holding that 
state law determines when an action has ―commenced‖ for purposes of tolling the statute of 
limitations). Because state law determines whether service is required to toll the statute of limitations, 
it makes sense that state law would determine how service must be performed. 
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Sibbach.
54
 It was therefore a valid federal law that spoke directly to the 
question, and it trumped state law.
55
 
After Hanna, the Court once again swung to the extreme, this time 
aggressively reading federal law to displace state law.
56
 The zenith of this 
Phase is illustrated by a pair of Alabama cases. In one, the plaintiff argued 
that federal courts sitting in diversity should follow Alabama courts in 
refusing to enforce forum-selection clauses.
57
 Such clauses were 
disfavored in Alabama.
58
 Although no federal law required that forum-
selection clauses be enforced, the Supreme Court held that the general 
change-of-venue statute covered the territory and therefore superseded 
Alabama law.
59
 The other Alabama case dealt with a state statute requiring 
defendants to pay penalties for unsuccessful appeals.
60
 Again, no federal 
law appeared directly on point. The Court, however, looked to federal 
provisions that give judges discretion to tax costs on appeal.
61
 In the 
Phase-Two enthusiasm for federal law over state law, these federal 
provisions were deemed sufficient to cover the territory of penalizing 
unsuccessful appeals, and therefore to justify disregarding the state law.
62
 
The Second Phase, then, was characterized by the Court‘s more aggressive 
use of federal procedural law to avoid obligations to advance state 
policies. 
After Hanna, it was also clear that there were two separate standards 
for distinguishing substance from procedure. In what Hanna called 
―unguided Erie‖ analysis,63 courts distinguish between substance and 
procedure by using the twin aims of Erie in combination with earlier 
precedents such as Guaranty Trust v. York and Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural 
Electric Cooperative, which ask whether the rule is outcome 
 
 
 54. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464 (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). Hanna 
did not discuss, but later Courts and commentators have suggested, that a Rule could be generally 
valid under Sibbach but invalid as applied. See infra text accompanying notes 114–28. 
 55. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464, 474. 
 56. The one exception is Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980), which is discussed 
infra note 69. 
 57. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 24 (1988). 
 58. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 24. 
 59. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006); Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28. 
 60. Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 3 (1987). The penalty was 10 percent of the 
judgment, plus costs on appeal. 
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 1912; FED. R. APP. P. 38; Burlington, 480 U.S. at 4. 
 62. Burlington, 480 U.S. at 7. A court anxious to defer to state law could have perceived a 
difference in purpose that would have allowed simultaneous application of the state and federal laws. 
Taxation of court costs alleviates a small portion of the overall financial costs of litigation, while a 10 
percent surcharge on the judgment is generally a more substantial amount and appears to be directed at 
abuse of the appellate process as a delay tactic. 
 63. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). 
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determinative, whether it is bound up with substantive rights, and whether 
there are countervailing federal interests.
64
 On the spectrum from 
substance to procedure, these tests mark a dividing line somewhere in the 
midst of an admittedly large gray area. In contrast, when the analysis is 
―guided‖ by the existence of a Federal Rule on point, the Court is much 
more inclined to find that the matter is procedural. That is, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure get the benefit of the doubt that they really are 
procedural. Thus, the dividing line created by the REA is at a different 
point on the spectrum than the RDA line. A state law that would be 
deemed ―substantive‖ under unguided Erie analysis might still be 
superseded by a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. 
For example, in Ragan, the Court concluded that the state‘s rule for 
how an action is ―commenced‖ for statute of limitations purposes is 
substantive under Erie.
65
 This conclusion followed naturally from 
Guaranty Trust, which held that statutes of limitations were themselves 
substantive.
66
 The federal court in Ragan was therefore obliged to follow 
state practice and hold that a diversity action had not been commenced 
until the summons had been served. After Hanna, this case might have 
come out the other way.
67
 Rather than apply Erie‘s substance/procedure 
test, the Court could have applied the REA test to Rule 3, which says that 
an action is ―commenced‖ when the complaint is filed.68 If the Rule was 
valid under the REA, it would control even in diversity cases and there 
would be no need for an unguided Erie analysis.
69
 
 
 
 64. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 (describing the ―twin aims‖ of Erie); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural 
Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958) (Byrd balancing test); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 
109 (1945) (outcome-determinative test). 
 65. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949). 
 66. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945). 
 67. The Supreme Court revisited Ragan after Hanna and adhered to its original holding, but it 
did so largely as a matter of stare decisis. Walker v. Armco Steel, 446 U.S. 740, 749, 750–51 (1980), 
discussed infra note 69. 
 68. FED. R. CIV. P. 3. 
 69. Again, the discussion in the text sets aside the possibility that the Rule is invalid as applied to 
displace a particular state law. See infra text accompanying notes 114–28. Guaranty Trust, Ragan, and 
Hanna all deal with rules that affect a statute of limitations. While it makes some sense for them all to 
come out the same way, there has to be a dividing line somewhere in the gradual transition between 
substance and procedure. Moreover, any discrepancy between Guaranty Trust and a decision 
overruling Ragan would be ameliorated by considering the purpose that ―commencement‖ of the 
action serves. The state law in Ragan required service before the end of the limitations period, 
presumably so the defendant would receive notice within that period. This approach is compatible with 
the fact that state courts may allow a complaint to languish for months or years without being served 
before it will be dismissed for failure to prosecute. See Cynthia Ford, Does It Have to Be This Hard? 
Rule 41(e) in Montana, 60 MONT. L. REV. 285, 347–51 (1999) (reviewing state rules regarding time 
for service of process and reporting that, at one extreme, several states followed the Federal Rule 
while, at the other extreme, California and Montana allowed three years). In federal court, however, 
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In the first two phases of Erie, the Court swung between two poles, 
first favoring state law, then federal law, especially the Federal Rules. 
What emerged, however, was a reasonably clear framework of federal 
supremacy tempered by the federalism of the RDA—or at least, it was 
reasonably clear after John Hart Ely explained it.
70
 In addition, the first 
two phases shared one overriding feature: in every case, the federal courts 
were told either to follow their normal federal practices, even in diversity 
cases, or to apply a particular rule of state law. In each case, the choice 
between these two options and the content of the rule to be applied flowed 
directly from federal laws, such as the REA, or from state laws, made 
binding on diversity courts by virtue of the RDA. 
C. Phase Three: A Third Way to Nowhere 
After swinging once to each extreme—over-zealous deference to state 
law, then aggressive implementation of the Federal Rules—one would 
hope that the Supreme Court would retreat to a happy medium. Instead, 
however, in Gasperini and Semtek, the Court unveiled a new approach to 
vertical choice of law in which, instead of choosing between state and 
federal practice, the Court made up its own rule that conformed to 
neither.
71
 Then, in Shady Grove, the Court splintered: Four dissenters 
would have continued down the new path, while a four-justice plurality 
rejected it.
72
 The ninth, Justice Stevens, appeared to lean toward the 
dissenters‘ theoretical approach but disagreed with the application and so 
voted with the plurality.
73
 
Robert Condlin has observed that Gasperini is ―the type of precedent 
that, in retrospect, often turns out to be either the harbinger of a new 
doctrinal order, or an analytical wild card never heard from again.‖74 Only 
 
 
service is generally required within 120 days of filing, which would ameliorate the concerns that 
presumably motivated the state law in Ragan. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m). Nonetheless, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed Ragan after Hanna. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980). Having 
already lived with the dual interpretation of Rule 3 for three decades, the Court chose not to overrule 
Ragan. Id. at 749 (noting the petitioner‘s inability to meet the burden of demonstrating why stare 
decisis should not control). 
 70. See Ely, supra note 1. Note that this conceptual framework would be consistent with a more 
rigorous approach to the REA‘s limitations on the Federal Rules. 
 71. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (discussed infra Part I.C.1); 
Semtek Int‘l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (discussed infra Part I.C.2). 
 72. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Insur. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (discussed 
infra Part I.C.3). 
 73. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 74. Robert J. Condlin, “A Formstone of Our Federalism”: The Erie/Hanna Doctrine & Casebook 
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time will tell ―whether Gasperini becomes an integral part of a new 
Erie/Hanna overview, or is forgotten as a doctrinal frolic and detour.‖75 
Two decisions later, the outcome is still unclear, especially because Justice 
Stevens, now retired, was the swing vote in Shady Grove.
76
 This Article 
aims to demonstrate that the Court should nip the Third Phase in its bud. 
Phase Three is characterized by creative interpretation that constitutes 
inappropriate freelancing by a Court that is supposed to be making a 
choice of law. 
1. Gasperini v. Center for the Humanities 
William Gasperini was a photographer who lent several hundred of his 
transparencies to the Center for the Humanities.
77
 The Center lost the 
negatives, and Gasperini sued for compensation. Sitting in diversity, the 
federal jury awarded $450,000, and the trial judge denied the Center‘s 
motion to remit the verdict.
78
 On appeal, the Center argued that the Second 
Circuit should review the reasonableness of the verdict pursuant to a New 
York tort reform statute.
79
 The statute directed intermediate courts of 
appeal to determine whether a jury verdict ―deviates materially from what 
would be reasonable compensation.‖80 The Center argued that this statute 
reflected substantive policy in the State of New York.
81
 The RDA 
therefore required the federal courts to follow New York law in place of 
ordinary federal practice, in which appellate review of jury verdicts is 
limited by historic practices under the common law.
82
 The Second Circuit 
agreed and ordered that the verdict be reduced.
83
 
In the Supreme Court, Gasperini argued that the New York statute 
conflicted with the Seventh Amendment.
84
 The Supreme Court appeared 
 
 
Law Reform, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 525 (2005). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Even the Shady Grove plurality, however, joined Semtek, a Phase-Three decision. Semtek, 
531 U.S. at 497. Indeed, Justice Scalia authored both Semtek and the Shady Grove plurality opinion. 
 77. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 419 (1996). 
 78. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 419–20. 
 79. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 420–21. 
 80. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 420 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c)). 
 81. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426. 
 82. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427, 432–33. 
 83. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426. 
 84. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426. The Gasperini dissent also argued that the New York law was 
displaced by Federal Rule 59. Id. at 468 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Responding to this argument in a 
footnote, the majority indicated that it disagreed with Justice Scalia about the scope of the Rules. Id. at 
437 n.22. For purposes of this Article, issues involving the applicability of a Federal Rule are 
adequately presented by Semtek and Shady Grove, so I follow the Court in passing lightly over that 
issue in Gasperini.  
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to agree, ruling that federal appellate courts cannot apply the New York 
standard.
85
 Under prior doctrine, that would have been the end of the 
matter. Because there is valid federal law on point, it preempts the state 
statute; federal courts obviously cannot rely on the RDA as grounds for 
ignoring the Seventh Amendment. Indeed, in Byrd, the mere shadow of 
the Seventh Amendment was enough to push the Court to declare the 
division of labor between judge and jury to be a matter of procedure, 
governed by federal law even in diversity cases.
86
 
In Gasperini, however, the Court did not stop there. Although it 
adhered to its view that federal law controlled, it changed federal law by 
inventing a new procedure to accommodate what it saw as New York‘s 
substantive concerns. Although the Seventh Amendment barred the Court 
of Appeals from reviewing the reasonableness of the jury verdict, the 
Court held that the trial court could review the verdict, under the standard 
set by the state statute.
87
 The result was ―a pastiche of federal and state 
law, but neither the one nor the other.‖88  
2. Semtek v. Lockheed Martin 
Semtek also involved the Court crafting a federal alternative rather than 
simply choosing state law or ordinary federal practice. Semtek is a 
confusing case, in part because of the knotty procedural problem at its 
center: the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal for failure to meet the 
statute of limitations.
89
 When a state court issues such a dismissal, state 
law governs the preclusive consequences.
90
 In California, where Semtek 
began, statute of limitations dismissals are not preclusive, so the plaintiff 
remains free to re-file in a state with a more generous limitations period.
91
 
 
 
 85. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 438. 
 86. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 & n.10 (1958) (stating that the 
Court‘s decision was made ―under the influence—if not the command—of the Seventh Amendment‖ 
and noting in a footnote that the Court was not deciding the Seventh Amendment question). 
 87. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 436. The preceding paragraphs describe the New York law at issue as 
it is described in the opening paragraph of Gasperini and as it has generally been treated in 
commentary on that case. A more precise description of New York law, and a discussion of the 
ramifications of that description, can be found infra Part III.C. 
 88. Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 707. 
 89. Semtek Int‘l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 499 (2001) (―This case presents 
the question whether the claim-preclusive effect of a federal judgment dismissing a diversity action on 
statute-of-limitations grounds is determined by the law of the State in which the federal court sits.‖). 
 90. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) (―[J]udicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit 
in every court within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage in courts of such State . . . 
from which they are taken.‖); Marrese v. Amer. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 375 
(1985). 
 91. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 500. 
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The extra twist was that the dismissal in Semtek was by a federal court 
sitting in diversity. In federal court, statute of limitations dismissals are 
usually preclusive.
92
 
The Supreme Court first asked whether the usual federal practice was 
controlling. Lockheed Martin argued that the case was governed by 
Rule 41(b), which at the time stated: 
Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof. . . . Unless the court in its 
order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other 
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for 
failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits.
93
 
Before Semtek, this Rule was widely understood to instruct that all 
dismissals other than those listed can be claim preclusive as a matter of 
federal law.
94
 In Semtek, however, the Court continued the unfortunate 
practice, begun in Ragan, of reading a Federal Rule to mean something 
different in diversity cases than in federal question cases. Rule 41(b), said 
the Court, does not speak to claim preclusion at all. Rather, it merely bars 
the plaintiff from re-filing the case in the same court.
95
 The Court‘s stated 
reason for this implausible reading of Rule 41(b) was the fear that the Rule 
as written was too substantive—that is, the Court suggested that the 
natural reading of the Rule might run afoul of the REA because it would 
modify or abridge the substantive right to bring the claim.
96
 
Having disposed of Rule 41(b), the Court was left with an unguided 
Erie choice: should it deem this matter substantive and apply state law or 
deem it procedural and apply some federal law? The twin aims of Erie 
favored applying state law.
97
 Moreover, the Court had just suggested that 
the preclusion question was ―too substantive‖ to be covered by the Federal 
 
 
 92. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 500. 
 93. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 
 94. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1045–46 (2002) (concluding based on the history of Rule 41‘s drafting 
that the Rule was intended to govern only eligibility for preclusion); Michael J. Edney, Preclusive 
Abstention: Issue Preclusion and Jurisdictional Dismissals After Ruhrgas, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 193, 205 
(2001) (―Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directly addresses the preclusive effect of 
a dismissal before a full trial on the merits . . . .‖); Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal Preclusion 
Law After Semtek, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 527, 577 (2003) (―[I]t is not surprising that [Rule 41] was the 
only Federal Rule that was understood to expressly address preclusion prior to Semtek.‖).  
 95. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 505–06. 
 96. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 506 n.2. See also Clermont, supra note 34 (manuscript at 125) (calling 
the Semtek interpretation of Rule 41(b) ―strangely narrow‖). 
 97. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508; see also supra text accompanying note 32. 
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Rules. Nonetheless, the Court insisted that federal law must control the 
preclusive effects of diversity judgments. The stated reason for this 
insistence was concern for the federal courts‘ ability to use dismissal of a 
case as a sanction.
98
 What if, posited the Court, a state did not recognize 
such a dismissal as preclusive? As discussed below, this concern was a red 
herring.
99
 For the Court, however, it was the justification for declaring that 
the Court itself had inherent power over a matter it had just deemed too 
substantive for a Federal Rule. 
In a final twist, the Court reverted to Erie principles to decide what the 
federal common law rule should be.
100
 Rather than choose a uniform rule 
of federal law, the Court held that federal common law would borrow the 
rule of the forum state unless, on a case-by-case basis, there was an 
important federal reason to choose a different rule.
101
 
3. Shady Grove v. Allstate 
The most recent installment of the Third Phase is Shady Grove v. 
Allstate.
102
 At issue in Shady Grove was an earlier New York tort reform 
statute. This one prohibited class actions to recover statutory 
―penalties.‖103 The New York statute conflicted with the ordinary 
understanding of Rule 23, which sets the conditions under which class 
actions are appropriate in federal court.
104
 
 
 
 98. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508–09. 
 99. See infra text accompanying notes 170–73. 
 100. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508–09 (―[A]ny other rule would produce the sort of ‗forum-shopping 
. . . and . . . inequitable administration of the laws‘ that Erie seeks to avoid.‖) (quoting Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)). 
 101. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508–09. This rule is reminiscent of Byrd, in which a matter otherwise 
governed by state law under the RDA can be governed by federal law if there is a countervailing 
federal interest. See also Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958), which is 
discussed supra note 34. The difference is that Byrd acknowledged an obligation to follow state law in 
the absence of such a federal interest, Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537, while the Semtek Court followed state law 
as a matter of federal judicial discretion. 
 102. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Insur. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 103. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436 (discussing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901). The prohibition on 
penalty class actions was enacted as part of a general revision of New York class action law in 
response to the 1966 amendments to Federal Rule 23. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Stephen B. Burbank & 
Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 59 U. PA. L. REV. 22 
(2011). It reflected concerns that penalty class actions lead to overenforcement. Id. at 70. 
 104. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1435; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Since its adoption and despite 
academic objections, Rule 23 has routinely been applied to class certifications without a prior 
determination that the underlying substantive law authorizes class recovery. See David L. Shapiro, 
Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 957 (1998) (arguing that 
Rule 23 should be neutral as to whether the ―entity model‖ of recovery through class actions is 
substantively permitted); see also infra text accompanying notes 223–26 (summarizing Martin Redish 
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Allstate, seeking to avoid a $5,000,000 class action in federal court 
when the lead plaintiff would only be entitled to $500, argued that Rule 23 
should be read more finely.
105
 Justice Ginsberg, writing for the four 
dissenters, followed the path of Ragan, agreeing with Allstate that Rule 23 
should be read to come into play only if the substantive law itself 
authorized class actions.
106
 Justice Ginsburg did not pretend that this 
reading of Rule 23 was natural. Rather, she argued that courts should 
consciously read the Rule to avoid conflict with the state‘s substantive 
policy goals: they should ―interpret the Federal Rules in light of a State‘s 
regulatory policy.‖107 
The plurality, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, rejected this argument 
that an individual state‘s policy should influence the interpretation of 
federal law.
108
 Justice Scalia argued that Rule 23 should be given its 
natural meaning as long as that meaning is valid under the REA.
109
 
Adhering to Sibbach‘s standard as a full statement of the REA‘s 
limitations, he maintained that as long as a Rule ―really regulates 
procedure‖ in a general sense, it trumps any conflicting state law, 
regardless of whether the state enacted the law for substantive policy 
purposes rather than procedural ones.
110
 Justice Stevens, the fifth vote for 
rejecting the application of state law in Shady Grove itself, wrote 
separately to hold out the possibility that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
could be invalid as applied in a rare case.
111
 A Rule that, in general, ―really 
regulates procedure‖ might create such a disruption in state substantive 
policy that it would be invalid for abridging, enlarging, or modifying a 
substantive right.
112
 However, Justice Stevens concluded that Shady Grove 
was not such a case, so he voted not to apply the state law.
113
 
The split in Shady Grove highlights an important debate over how to 
determine the validity of Federal Rules. The current test is that a Rule is 
 
 
and JoEllen Lind‘s arguments regarding the use of procedural rules to facilitate or impede class 
actions). 
 105. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438. 
 106. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1468 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 107. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1466–67 & n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 108. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1440–41. 
 109. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442. 
 110. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444–45 (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13–14 
(1941)). 
 111. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1451–52 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 112. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452–54 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 113. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
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valid if it ―really regulates procedure.‖114 This generous standard comes 
from subpart (a) of the REA, which authorizes regulation of ―practice and 
procedure and rules of evidence.‖115 Academics have long bemoaned the 
Supreme Court‘s neglect of subpart (b), which many interpret as an 
independent limit on the Rules.
116
 That is, even a Rule that ―really 
regulates procedure‖ might be invalid if it also ―abridge[s], enlarge[s], or 
modif[ies] any substantive right.‖117 Shady Grove exposed a split between 
those who would apply subpart (b) on a case-by-case, retail basis and 
those who would determine the validity of Federal Rules strictly at the 
wholesale level.
118
 
Justice Scalia‘s plurality in Shady Grove took the wholesale approach. 
The plurality opinion evaluated Rule 23 on its own terms and found it to 
be targeted at the regulation of procedure.
119
 While the plurality inquired 
in a general sense whether the Rule regulated substantive matters, it did so 
without reference to the particular state law at issue.
120
 As it happens, the 
plurality‘s assessment of Rule 23 was especially deferential, even 
simplistic. The opinion characterized class treatment as merely a matter of 
joinder, disregarding powerful arguments to the contrary.
121
 One need not, 
however, take such a deferential approach to the Rules in order to analyze 
the validity of a Rule wholesale. One could adopt a more rigorous 
approach to the REA‘s limitations and still apply them wholesale. The key 
to the wholesale approach is that it hinges on the substantive or procedural 
qualities of the Rule itself, without regard to the state law that the Rule 
displaces.
122
 
The Shady Grove dissent, and to a lesser extent Justice Stevens, took 
the retail approach. They would determine the validity of the Federal Rule, 
 
 
 114. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1445. 
 115. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006). 
 116. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 1, at 719–20; Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in 
the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 48 (1998) (collecting citations); 
see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1108 (1982) 
(arguing that § 2072(b) does not have independent effect distinct from the effect of § 2072(a) but that 
both reflect more substantial limitations on the courts than current doctrine acknowledges). 
 117. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
 118. In addition to the Shady Grove opinions, compare Ely, supra note 1, at 733–34 (advocating 
case-by-case determination of whether a state‘s interest in its laws is substantive or procedural) with 
Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 727 (―The cautionary example of what has happened in the 
related field of conflicts of laws, where case-by-case balancing of interests has threatened to 
destabilize the entire field, should lead the Supreme Court to reinforce rather than retreat from a 
uniform interpretation of general rules of procedure.‖). 
 119. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443–44. 
 120. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444. 
 121. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443. 
 122. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444. 
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as applied, with reference to the state law.
123
 If the state law is understood 
to serve substantive aims but uses a procedural mechanism to achieve 
them, the Federal Rule may have to give way.
124
 For example, John Hart 
Ely explained that whether a state prohibition on court-ordered medical 
exams applied in federal court would depend on the reason for the state 
ban.
125
 If the ban were part of a general scheme of limited discovery, it 
would be deemed procedural and thus trumped by the federal practice.
126
 
If, however, the state had enacted the ban as substantive protection for the 
right to personal privacy, federal courts would have to honor it in diversity 
cases.
127
 In Shady Grove, the dissent argued that the state‘s restriction on 
class actions served the substantive goal of limiting liability under penalty 
clauses. Rule 23 was thus inapplicable in the particular circumstances of 
the case, even if it is generally valid as a regulation of procedure.
128
 
The retail side of the wholesale/retail debate is the first step toward the 
discretionary approach that characterizes Phase Three. In Shady Grove, the 
dissent would have adopted an ad hoc interpretation of Rule 23 designed 
to accommodate a particular state law. This form of accommodation is a 
step toward Gasperini and Semtek, in which the Court created its own 
procedures that combined elements of state and federal law. The degree of 
judicial discretion is greater in the latter two cases, but the willingness to 
strain federal law is the same and is still in keeping with Phase Three. 
II. WHAT‘S WRONG WITH THE THIRD WAY 
Gasperini and Semtek have been extensively analyzed and criticized, 
and the same fate surely awaits Shady Grove. The divide between the 
plurality and the dissent in Shady Grove presents a stark choice between 
continuing the Phase-Three approach begun in Gasperini and Semtek or 
returning to something like the conceptual structure of Phase Two. 
Part II.A summarizes the extant criticism of the Phase-Three approach 
to Erie questions. Part II.B argues that the judicial discretion that 
characterizes Phase Three is unwarranted. Part II.C refutes the primary 
theoretical justification for that discretion: While the Court has adopted a 
 
 
 123. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 1451 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 124. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1461–64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 1451–52 & n.5 (Stevens, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 125. Ely, supra note 1, at 733–34 (using the facts of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941)). 
 126. Id. at 734. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1468 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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pose of vindicating federalism by accommodating state policies, the 
Phase-Three approach is neither required nor even necessarily helpful for 
protecting the results of democratic processes in the states. 
A. The Chorus of Criticism 
The nascent Third Phase represented by Gasperini and Semtek (and 
embraced by the Shady Grove dissent) has been criticized from several 
quarters for being confusing and for failing to give adequate guidance to 
the lower courts.
129
 Kevin Clermont offers mild praise for the Shady Grove 
plurality for bringing greater clarity to Erie doctrine while backing off 
from what I am calling the Phase-Three approach.
130
 The most common 
complaint about Semtek and the Shady Grove dissent is their return to the 
practice of creating dual readings for Federal Rules: Semtek and the Shady 
Grove dissent both accepted strained, implausible interpretations of 
Federal Rules to be used only in diversity cases, with the more natural 
interpretation continuing to prevail in federal question cases.
131
 The 
creative textualism of Semtek‘s Rule 41 and the Shady Grove dissent‘s 
Rule 23 is perhaps to be admired as a matter of lawyerly semantic skill, 
but it should not be embraced by courts.
132
 
Commentators have also noted that the ad hoc approach of the Third 
Phase is in tension with Erie itself. Earl Dudley and George Rutherglen 
observe that ―federal district courts today arguably possess greater 
freedom to reach desired results in diversity cases than they had under 
 
 
 129. See, e.g., Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 708 (describing a ―chorus of academic 
criticism‖ for Gasperini and Semtek); Rowe, supra note 34, at 963–66 (summarizing criticism of 
Gasperini and defending the decision); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Has the Erie Doctrine Been 
Repealed by Congress?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1629, 1635 (2008) (calling Gasperini ―pitiful‖). 
 130. Clermont, supra note 34. 
 131. See, e.g., Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 708–09 (summarizing the authors‘ 
criticisms of Gasperini and Semtek), 717 (describing practical problems that are likely to arise from 
reading Rule 59 (at issue in Gasperini) differently in diversity cases than in federal question cases), 
722–23 (noting that Semtek‘s construction of the phrase ―adjudication upon the merits‖ in Rule 41 was 
original to Semtek and ―so far as we have been able to determine, ha[d not] been adopted anywhere 
else, let alone in the federal system‖); J. Benjamin King, Clarification and Disruption: The Effect of 
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. on the Erie Doctrine, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 161, 164 (1997) 
(arguing that Gasperini undermines reliance on apparently applicable Federal Rules). 
 132. One reason for rejecting such unnatural readings in order to reach a result in a particular case 
is that potential for unforeseen consequences in other cases is substantial. For example, the Shady 
Grove dissent would separate the ―substantive‖ question of whether class remedies are available for a 
particular cause of action from the ―procedural‖ questions addressed by Rule 23. Shady Grove, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1440. While perhaps a clever resolution of the case before it, such a holding would have opened 
the door to litigation over whether class remedies are ―available‖ as to every cause of action, 
effectively creating a whole new field of law. See Posting of Edward A. Hartnett, 
edward.hartnett@shu.edu, to CIV-PRO@LISTSERV.ND.EDU (Mar. 31, 2010) (on file with author). 
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Swift v. Tyson.‖133 Douglas Floyd similarly complains that Gasperini‘s 
open-ended interest balancing will lead to ―unwarranted subordination of 
substantive state objectives to ad hoc judicial perceptions of amorphous 
federal procedural ‗interests.‘‖134 
Other commentators have praised both Gasperini and Semtek. Stephen 
Burbank claims responsibility for much of Semtek, although he parts ways 
with the Court over its strained reading of Rule 41(b), suggesting that the 
Rule should simply have been held invalid.
135
 Praise for Gasperini has 
come from those, like Thomas Rowe and Richard Freer, who applaud the 
effort to accommodate state law and to give independent, retail-level 
meaning to Part (b) of the REA.
136
 Professor Freer, however, is critical of 
the Court‘s application of Erie‘s twin aims,137 and Professor Rowe‘s praise 
was in part contingent on the Court‘s continued production of solid 
majority opinions, a record that was broken by the splintered decision in 
Shady Grove.
138
 
This Article joins with the critics of the discretion exercised by the 
Supreme Court in Gasperini and the dissent in Shady Grove. It adds, in 
Part II.B.1, that Semtek is of the same mold and, in Part II.C, that 
democracy in the states may actually be better served by abandoning the 
Phase Three approach. 
B. The Supreme Court Should Not Freelance on Choice-of-Law Questions 
This Part argues that the Supreme Court‘s freelancing on choice-of-law 
questions involves an unwarranted exercise of federal judicial discretion. 
In Semtek, the Court announced that federal common law would govern 
the preclusive effect of federal diversity judgments, declining to apply 
either Rule 41 or state law. Under the terms of Semtek itself, the Court‘s 
authority for creating common law was suspect, and the Court did not 
 
 
 133. Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 744–45. Interestingly, the lower courts do not seem 
as interested in exercising this freedom as does the Supreme Court. See infra Part III.A. 
 134. C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment on Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 1997 
BYU L. REV. 267, 269–70.  
 135. Burbank, supra note 94, at 1039–47. 
 136. Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637 
(1998); Rowe, supra note 34. Professor Rowe supports allowing states to override Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure on substantive policy grounds, arguing that such overrides will be rare and could 
always be trumped by Congress. 
 137. Freer, supra note 136, at 1654–57. 
 138. Rowe, supra note 34, at 1014–15. Shady Grove also dashed Professor Rowe‘s hope that the 
Gasperini dissenters were driven primarily by Seventh Amendment concerns and would join the rest 
of the Court‘s deferential interpretive approach in future cases. Id. at 1008. 
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justify its claim of power.
139
 In Gasperini, the Court presented itself as 
creatively seeking an accommodation of its own devising between state 
and federal law, effectively creating a federal common law of New York 
remedies.
140
 This, too, the Court failed to justify. In both cases, the Court 
should have eschewed the freelancing that characterizes the Third Phase. 
1. The Trouble With Semtek: The Court’s Inherent Powers Cannot 
Logically Exceed the Power of the Court and Congress Acting 
Together 
Semtek‘s reasoning is like a Möbius strip. The question presented starts 
out as a seemingly procedural one regarding the effect of Federal 
Rule 41(b).
141
 But no, says the Court, the question is substantive and 
therefore not reachable by the Federal Rules.
142
 Turn the page again, 
however, and it is once again procedural—at least, procedural enough to 
be subject to the inherent powers of the federal courts.
143
 If preclusion is 
―too substantive‖ to be regulated by the Supreme Court and Congress 
acting together through the REA, then the courts should not be able to 
regulate it pursuant to their inherent power to regulate procedure. 
The usual rule is that the preclusive effect of a judgment is governed by 
the law of the court that rendered the judgment.
144
 This rule allows the 
parties to make reasonable predictions of potential preclusive effects and 
to behave accordingly; it also vindicates the procedural interests of the 
forum, which uses future preclusive effects as tools for controlling the 
parties‘ behavior.145 Because the source of the law that will govern future 
preclusive effects should be ascertainable at the time the first judgment is 
 
 
 139. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 140. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 141. Semtek Int‘l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501 (2001). 
 142. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503–04. 
 143. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508. This is not to suggest that questions of preclusion must be deemed 
inherently ―substantive‖ or ―procedural‖ for all purposes. The distinction may be made differently 
under the RDA and the REA. However, as discussed infra this section, the inquiries under the two 
statutes are similar enough that a matter deemed ―substantive‖ for REA purposes (under the current, 
generous standard, which is highly deferential to the Federal Rules) should also be deemed 
―substantive‖ for RDA purposes (under the unguided Erie analysis, which favors the ―substantive‖ 
label and thus the application of state law). The difference between the REA and the RDA tests lies in 
the realm that is considered procedural in the sense that it may be governed by a Federal Rule but, in 
the absence of a Rule, would be governed by state law rather than federal practice. 
 144. See Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 1001–02 
(1998). Courts sometimes apply the preclusion law of the law-supplying jurisdiction from the first 
case. Id. Either way, preclusive effects are predictable, since they do not depend on the law of the 
enforcing jurisdiction. 
 145. See Erichson, supra note 144, at 1002–03. 
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rendered, we can imagine that every judgment contains an invisible 
footnote specifying the preclusion law that applies. A California judgment, 
for example, contains an invisible footnote summarizing California 
preclusion law. When that judgment is presented as a defense to litigation 
in a Maryland court, the Maryland court applies the decisions embodied in 
the judgment and the California rules of preclusion to the allegations made 
in the Maryland action. From these elements, it determines whether the 
Maryland action is precluded. The question in Semtek was: When a federal 
court in California sits in diversity, does the invisible footnote to its 
judgment contain California preclusion law or federal preclusion law? 
As described above, the defendant in Semtek first argued that federal 
law controlled because Rule 41(b) made the federal judgment 
preclusive.
146
 In the first part of the opinion, however, the Court adopted 
an implausible reading of Rule 41(b), stating that this reading was 
necessary because preclusion was dangerously substantive even for REA 
purposes.
147
 The Court warned that reading Rule 41(b) to govern 
preclusive effect ―would arguably violate the jurisdictional limitation of 
the Rules Enabling Act: that the Rules ‗shall not abridge, enlarge or 
modify any substantive right.‘‖148 This argument suggests that on the 
spectrum from substance to procedure, the preclusion question in Semtek 
falls on the ―substance‖ side of the dividing line created by the REA. 
Semtek‘s justification for its narrow reading of Rule 41(b) was that that 
preclusion is ―too substantive‖ for the REA.149 
As discussed in Part I, the dividing line created by the REA is different 
from the dividing line created by unguided Erie analysis pursuant to the 
RDA. The REA line favors the application of federal law and thus favors 
the label ―procedure.‖ The RDA line does the opposite. The difference 
between the two is that some matters may be ―procedural‖ for REA 
purposes but ―substantive‖ for RDA purposes. Therefore, even the 
possibility of being ―too substantive‖ for the REA should mean that 
preclusion is ―substantive‖ for Erie purposes as well.150 That means that, 
under the RDA, the federal courts should follow state law. The invisible 
 
 
 146. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 501. 
 147. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503–04. 
 148. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000)). 
 149. One could read Semtek as addressing not preclusion generally but preclusive effect in the 
context of statute of limitations dismissals. This reading is discussed infra Part III.B as an option for 
limiting Semtek‘s effect, but it is not the most natural reading of the opinion, which speaks as if to 
questions of preclusion generally. 
 150. In other words, the set of legal rules that are ―procedural‖ for RDA purposes is a wholly 
contained subset of the set of legal rules that are ―procedural‖ for REA purposes. 
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footnote of a diversity judgment would contain state law, and the 
preclusive effect of the judgment of a federal court sitting in diversity 
would be governed by the preclusion law of the state that provided the 
substantive law. 
And indeed, the Court initially suggested that this outcome would be 
required, for it stated that applying the Federal Rule ―would in many cases 
violate the federalism principle of Erie . . . .‖151 Citing Walker v. Armco 
Steel, Hanna v. Plumer, and Guaranty Trust v. York,
152
 the Court argued 
that giving force to the Federal Rule would result in substantial variation 
in outcomes between state and federal court, leading to the inequities and 
forum shopping that the ―twin aims‖ test is meant to prevent.153 So far, 
preclusion sounds substantive for Erie purposes, and substantive enough 
for REA purposes that a Rule treading the ground of preclusion should be 
drained of life. This analysis ought to mean that the federal courts are 
required by the RDA to follow state law. 
In the second half of Semtek, however, the Court reversed course, 
deciding that the preclusive effect of diversity judgments would instead be 
governed by federal common law.
154
 As support, the Court cited cases 
suggesting that federal law controlled the preclusive effect of federal 
judgments, but it conflated federal question cases with diversity cases and 
conflated the obligation to give full faith and credit to federal judgments 
with the determination of what such faith requires.
155
 The Court also relied 
on a pre-REA case that it had already said no longer controlled.
156
 The 
justification for making federal common law takes up barely more than a 
page in the United States Reports, and nowhere does it identify the source 
of the Court‘s authority.157 
 
 
 151. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 504. 
 152. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); 
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). For more on these cases, see supra Part I. 
 153. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 504. 
 154. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507–08. 
 155. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507 (citing Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938); Gunter v. Atl. Coast 
Line R. Co., 200 U.S. 273 (1906); Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499 (1903)). All three of the 
cited cases involved the preclusive effects of federal judgments in federal question cases. After citing 
them, the Semtek opinion states that ―[t]he reasoning of that line of cases suggests‖ that the same 
conclusion should be reached with respect to diversity judgments. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507. This 
assertion is conclusory: None of those three cases involved the preclusive effects of diversity 
judgments, and the opinions therefore fail to speak to the reasons why the rule in diversity cases might 
differ from the rule in federal question cases.  
 156. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 501, 507–08 (discussing Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130 
(1874)). 
 157. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507–09. 
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Commentators have suggested that Semtek was based on the Supreme 
Court‘s inherent authority to govern procedural matters in the federal 
courts.
158
 Although the Court is generally obliged to follow congressional 
commands even in the realm of procedure, it is usually thought to be free 
to develop rules of practice and procedure in the absence of congressional 
action or a governing Rule.
159
 Its authority to do so comes either from 
Article III‘s establishment of the judicial branch or from Congress‘s 
creation of lower courts and conferral of jurisdiction to decide cases.
160
 
The problem with relying on this inherent power to explain Semtek is that 
before turning to the inherent power, the Semtek Court had strongly 
suggested that the matter at issue was substantive under both the REA and 
the RDA.
161
 Of course, the location of the substance–procedure line may 
vary according to the legal context, and we have already said that it is 
different for the REA than for the RDA. The line could certainly lie in yet 
another location for purposes of inherent power. However, if preclusion is 
substantive for REA and RDA purposes, but procedural for inherent power 
purposes, then the realm of inherent power is larger than the realm that 
can be governed by Rules promulgated under the REA. This scheme 
seems unlikely. The Supreme Court has already interpreted the REA to 
permit any rule that ―really regulates procedure.‖162 This generous 
standard reflects the reality that Congress‘s blessing in the REA enhances 
the Court‘s inherent power. Just as in the Steel Seizure Case,163 the powers 
belonging to one branch of government are at their strongest when that 
branch acts in concert with another branch.
164
 The Court‘s inherent power 
 
 
 158. See Woolley, supra note 94, at 537 (―While the Court did not identify the source of authority 
for a federal common law of preclusion, it would appear that statutes creating the federal courts and 
bestowing jurisdiction upon them provide an adequate basis—albeit an implicit one—for the 
development of common law rules in this area.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 159. See Joseph J. Anclien, Broader Is Better: The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts, 64 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 37, 41 (2008) (describing the predominant view that inherent powers exist only in 
―cases of indispensable necessity‖ and arguing for a broader view); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent 
Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 743 (2001) (―As the 
early Justices recognized but the modern Court has forgotten, the Necessary and Proper Clause 
authorizes Congress alone to determine whether or not to bestow beneficial powers.‖). 
 160. Barrett, supra note 14, at 835–46 (discussing the implications of these two potential sources 
of authority). 
 161. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503–04. 
 162. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Insur. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010) 
(adhering to this standard). 
 163. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (―When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of 
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all 
that Congress can delegate.‖). 
 164. Cf. Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CAL. L. REV. 595, 598–99 (2008) (―Federal 
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to make procedural law should not exceed its power to do the same when 
buttressed by congressional authority.
165
 As Elizabeth Lear has explained, 
The Rules Enabling Act . . . and the Rules of Decision Act are . . . 
relevant to the scope of the Court‘s inherent power, representing 
efforts by Congress to minimize friction between the federal courts 
and Congress, and the federal courts and the States, respectively. 
Together they form the outer limits of judicial innovation on the 
procedural front. . . . While Congress may enact substantive or 
procedural statutes that displace the substantive law of the States, 
the Rules of Decision Act prohibits the Court from doing so under 
the guise of the inherent power.
166
 
For these reasons, the realm of inherent power should be a subset of the 
realm of the REA. If preclusion is substantive for RDA purposes, either 
the Federal Rule validly applies and controls, or else state law controls. 
Depending on whether the Semtek Court was correct in the first half of its 
opinion (calling preclusion substantive for both REA and RDA purposes) 
or the second half (treating preclusion as procedural), either the Court 
wrongly displaced the states‘ substantive authority or it wrongly ignored, 
through convoluted interpretation, its own prior promulgation of 
Rule 41(b). 
There are two defenses that one could make of the Court‘s analysis in 
Semtek, but each ultimately fails. First, perhaps my conception of the 
spectrum from substance to procedure is misleadingly linear. I have 
suggested that matters of ―procedure‖ under the RDA and inherent powers 
must be wholly contained subsets of matters that are ―procedural‖ under 
 
 
common law could be analogized to Justice Jackson‘s discussion of presidential authority in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. Jackson‘s opinion explains the basic interaction between 
Congress and a branch with largely derivative constitutional authority. I suggest that those dynamics 
work similarly whether one considers Congress and the President (Youngstown), or Congress and the 
Judiciary (federal common law).‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 165. Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on 
the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147, 1184, 1195 (2006) (―[I]t would be very 
odd indeed if the Court could evade this restriction simply by relying on its inherent power. . . . The 
Rules of Decision Act represents the congressional vision of the appropriate balance between state law 
and inherent power lawmaking by the federal courts.‖). 
 166. Lear, supra note 165, at 1180–81; see also Wendy Collins Perdue, The Sources and Scope of 
Federal Procedural Common Law: Some Reflections on Erie and Gasperini, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 751, 
760 (1998) (―The Rules Enabling Act may constrain courts, even where they are not directly 
interpreting a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure but are instead creating a federal common law rule of 
‗practice and procedure.‘ As Professors Westen and Lehman argue, ‗the statutory prohibition on rules 
that abridge ―substantive rights‖ must be deemed to apply to judge-made rules too; otherwise, judges 
could do through common law adjudication what they cannot do through the carefully circumscribed 
and safeguarded mechanisms used to create the federal rule of civil procedure.‘‖). 
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the REA.
167
 Perhaps, however, the relationships among the RDA, the 
REA, and inherent power are multidimensional. There might then be a 
way to justify the Court‘s use of inherent power along a different axis. 
Second, perhaps preclusion truly is substantive: Semtek is justified not by 
the Court‘s inherent power over procedure but by substantive power to 
make federal common law. 
The first defense would draw on the long-neglected Part (b) of § 2072, 
which prohibits a Federal Rule from abridging, enlarging, or modifying a 
substantive right.
168
 Commentators have long complained that the Court‘s 
―really regulates procedure‖ test for validity under the REA implements 
only § 2072(a), authorizing the Court to promulgate rules of practice and 
procedure.
169
 Many believe that some further constraint is needed in order 
to fulfill § 2072(b)‘s command not to alter substantive rights.170 Preclusion 
is a classic example of a body of law that is ―procedural‖ in a sense but 
can also reasonably be understood to alter substantive rights.
171
 It might 
then validly lie within the Court‘s inherent power over procedure while 
still being ―too substantive‖ for the REA. 
The problem with this first defense of Semtek is the RDA. Surely, if 
preclusion law alters substantive rights, it is substantive not just under the 
REA but also under Erie/Hanna/RDA. The RDA thus directs the federal 
courts to apply state law. The Semtek decision does not demonstrate that 
state law does not ―apply,‖ and thus control, under the terms of the RDA. 
Analogy to Justice Jackson‘s Steel Seizure framework is again useful 
here:
172
 While the Court‘s power over procedure is at its maximum when it 
acts in conjunction with Congress, as under the REA, the Court‘s power is 
minimal when it acts contrary to congressional command.
173
 The adoption 
of federal common law contrary to Congress‘s policy of following state 
law can be justified under the inherent power only to protect the core 
 
 
 167. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 168. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
 169. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 1, at 719–20; Kelleher, supra note 116, at 48 (collecting citations). 
 170. An alternative view is that the two together should have more teeth than the ―really regulates 
procedure‖ test has exhibited. See Burbank, supra note 116, at 1108 (arguing that § 2072(b) does not 
have independent effect distinct from the effect of § 2072(a) but that the Court‘s approach since 
Sibbach is too lenient). 
 171. See Barrett, supra note 14, at 830–31 (treating preclusion as a matter of procedural common 
law but noting that its ―status as ‗procedural‘ is . . . open to doubt‖). 
 172. See supra notes 162–66 and accompanying text (discussing Steel Seizure). 
 173. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (―When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or 
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own 
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.‖). 
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ability of the federal courts to perform their judicial function.
174
 That is a 
heavy burden, which the Semtek Court did not attempt to meet. 
Similarly, any legal rule that would be deemed ―procedural‖ for 
Erie/RDA purposes is also sufficiently procedural to be within the scope 
of the REA.
175
 A matter cannot be ―too substantive‖ for the REA yet 
within the scope of inherent power. The first defense therefore fails. 
The second defense acknowledges preclusion as substantive for most 
or all purposes. This defense posits that the authority claimed in Semtek 
was not the inherent power over procedure but rather common law-making 
power such as the Court exercises over maritime law or suits to which the 
United States is a party.
176
 In order to make federal common law, however, 
the Court is supposed to identify the federal interest that is at stake.
177
 
There are two federal interests that are potentially at stake in the preclusive 
effect of a diversity judgment: First, there is an interest in ensuring that 
federal judgments receive full faith and credit. It is not apparent, however, 
that this interest extends any further than ensuring that the diversity 
judgment receives the same respect that would be accorded to a state court 
judgment. Second, there is a federal interest in the conduct of the initial 
litigation, which will be affected by the anticipated preclusive effects of 
the judgment.
178
 That, however, is a procedural interest, and to justify 
federal common law on that basis without invoking the federal courts‘ 
power to regulate their own proceedings would be too fine a cut. 
The Semtek Court did describe one situation in which such a federal 
procedural interest would exist and would require a federal rule to control 
preclusive effect.
179
 That one situation was the possibility that a state‘s 
 
 
 174. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the scope of inherent power relative to power under the 
REA). 
 175. This discussion assumes that a Federal Rule is either valid or invalid under the REA, 
ignoring the possibility that a Rule might be generally valid but invalid as applied to displace a 
particular state practice that serves substantive goals. See infra Part II.C (discussing reasons why Rules 
should not be invalidated as applied). The issue of as-applied invalidity was not at play in Semtek since 
the case involved the general rules of what preclusion laws should apply, not a state‘s idiosyncratic use 
of matters ordinarily deemed procedural to achieve a substantive policy goal. 
 176. See Barrett, supra note 14, at 831–32 (―In Semtek, the Supreme Court hinted that its power to 
formulate federal rules of preclusion rests on the same ground as its power to formulate substantive 
common law: the lack of congressional guidance in an area of clearly federal concern.‖). However, 
Barrett also points out that the Court did not elaborate on this justification in Semtek and that its other 
preclusion cases have been silent on the source of power. Id. at 832. 
 177. See id. at 835, 837 n.73 (identifying the grounds for judicial power to formulate substantive 
common law). 
 178. Erichson, supra note 144, at 1002–03 (discussing the forum‘s interest in the preclusion rules 
that would later be applied to a judgment). 
 179. Semtek Int‘l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001). 
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courts might not give preclusive effect to dismissal as a sanction.
180
 This 
policy would conflict with a federal court‘s interest in making its sanction 
stick. The Semtek Court seemed to fear that, having intimated that 
preclusion was substantive under the REA and flat-out stated that it was 
substantive under Erie, it would be forced to live with the whims of states 
that impose only ineffective sanctions on misbehaving litigants. This 
example is an unconvincing basis for replacing state preclusion law with 
federal common law if preclusion is, indeed, properly understood as 
substantive for REA and RDA purposes. State courts, like federal courts, 
prefer their sanctions to be meaningful, so it seems unlikely that a state 
would adopt such a self-defeating policy as the Semtek Court imagined. 
Moreover, there is no need to contort either preclusion law or Erie 
doctrine to deal with that slight possibility. A federal court certainly has 
the power to deprive a misbehaving party of property as a sanction, 
whether that property takes the form of cash or a cause of action.
181
 That 
hardly means that that we need a federal common law of property. 
Moreover, Byrd already permits case-by-case balancing of state and 
federal interests, so a matter that would otherwise be controlled by state 
law can be federalized because of compelling federal concerns in a 
particular situation.
182
 If the Supreme Court truly believes that preclusion 
is an otherwise substantive matter, the dismissal-as-sanction example at 
best warrants federal common law only as an exception, not as the general 
rule. 
The outcome reached in Semtek has intuitive appeal: preclusion has a 
substantive feel, especially in the context of a statute of limitations 
dismissal, yet an equally strong intuition says that federal courts must 
retain control over the enforcement of their judgments. As discussed 
below, these concerns could be addressed without the free-wheeling 
approach to judicial authority on display in Semtek.
183
 The Supreme Court 
should not shake off the yoke of the REA by hinting that a matter is 
substantive while simultaneously claiming inherent procedural authority to 
regulate the matter on its own. 
 
 
 180. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 509. 
 181. See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 52–53 (1991) (holding that Erie did not prevent a 
federal court from using its inherent power to sanction a litigant, even where the state court might not 
have imposed a similar sanction). 
 182. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958) (allowing courts to 
balance Erie concerns against countervailing federal interests); cf. Woolley, supra note 94 (arguing 
that even under Semtek, most preclusion questions will be governed by federal law because the federal 
interest will predominate). 
 183. See infra Part II.C. 
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2. The Trouble With Gasperini: The RDA Does Not Authorize a Body 
of Federal Common Law 
Other than the Supreme Court‘s inherent power over procedure, there 
is only one possible source of authority for making a federal common law 
of preclusion for diversity cases. It is also the only available source of 
authority for making a federal common law of New York tort damages in 
Gasperini. That source is the RDA itself. The point of Erie, however, was 
that neither the RDA nor any other provision of federal law authorizes 
federal courts to create general common law.
184
 To the extent that the 
Gasperini Court perceived itself as creatively accommodating state law to 
the requirements of federal constitutional procedure, it reached beyond its 
authority, as it did in Semtek. 
Congress‘s grant of diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts could, in 
theory, be understood to include a grant of lawmaking power.
185
 In the 
course of hearing common law claims, the federal courts would make the 
law to apply to those claims. However, the RDA, as interpreted in Erie, 
rejects that approach.
186
 Rather than authorizing federal courts to make 
substantive law, it directs them to take the applicable state law as they find 
it. 
In Gasperini, the Court behaved as if it were trapped between the 
RDA‘s command that it follow the state‘s substantive policy and the 
Seventh Amendment‘s command to respect the jury‘s verdict.187 In a 
conflict between a state statute and the Constitution, it is clear which one 
prevails. Nonetheless, the Court responded to the force of Erie policy by 
seeking out a resolution that would enforce state policy without offending 
the Seventh Amendment, perhaps distorting its Seventh Amendment 
analysis to get there.
188
 The RDA, however, says that the federal courts 
should follow state law where it applies, not that they should devise new 
laws in order to serve the policy goals they believe to have been 
articulated by the states. The Court‘s freelancing in Gasperini took it 
exactly where Erie meant it should not go: rather than simply apply state 
 
 
 184. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 185. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
881, 915–16 (1986) (noting this possibility and its rejection in Erie); Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, 
A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 623 (2006) (noting that Semtek involved 
federal common lawmaking based solely on the existence of diversity jurisdiction). 
 186. See Field, supra note 185, at 915–16. 
 187. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 188. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 629 (2000) (sharply criticizing 
Gasperini‘s treatment of the Seventh Amendment, calling it ―aberrant‖ and not worthy of deference as 
a matter of stare decisis). 
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law, the Court had to discern what policies New York legislators meant to 
pursue, balance those state policies with federal interests, and devise a 
practice that the Court believed would appropriately accommodate those 
interests.
189
 
As in Semtek, in Gasperini the Court took upon itself the authority to 
formulate the law that would apply to a diversity case. In Semtek, the 
Court appears to have done so on the basis of its inherent powers. As 
shown in Part II.A, however, inherent powers were unavailable in light of 
the Semtek Court‘s rationale for rejecting the applicability of Rule 41(b). 
In Gasperini, the Court did not explain why it could develop policy to 
accommodate state interests rather than simply apply (or not apply) state 
law. The RDA rejects such a role for the federal courts in diversity. In 
both Semtek and Gasperini, the Court‘s approach was justified in the name 
of accommodating state substantive policy but resulted in discretionary, 
policy-making authority accruing in the federal courts.
190
 
C. The REA and the Scope of State Legislative Authority 
In Semtek and Gasperini, the Supreme Court seemed to see itself as 
serving the goals of Erie and the RDA by accommodating state law, yet 
retaining federal supremacy where necessary. This Part argues that the 
Court‘s good intentions toward the states were misplaced. The Court‘s 
efforts to forge creative compromises between state and federal practices 
magnify judicial discretion, which is contrary to both the federalism and 
the separation of powers aspects of Erie and the REA. Moreover, the 
Court‘s justification for increasing its own discretion—greater 
accommodation of state law—is flawed. Paradoxically, federalism and 
respect for state authority over substantive law could be equally well 
served by a wholesale approach that adheres to valid Federal Rules 
regardless of the states‘ idiosyncratic use of procedure to serve substantive 
goals. This is so because a uniformly applied set of Federal Rules would 
put state lawmakers on notice of the procedures to be used in diversity 
cases and allow them to formulate their substantive law accordingly. This 
 
 
 189. As noted above, this description of Gasperini is based on the summary paragraph at the 
beginning of the opinion, Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 418–19, and the presentation of the case in most 
commentaries. See supra note 79. A better approach, which the Court may have had in mind but which 
it did not clearly express, is described infra Part III.C. 
 190. See generally Laura E. Little, Empowerment Through Restraint: Reverse Preemption or 
Hybrid Lawmaking?, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 955, 958–59 (2009) (demonstrating that apparent 
deference to state law can ―empower a strong federal judiciary‖ and highlighting the opportunities 
thereby created for hybrid lawmaking, especially the incorporation of principles of international law). 
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approach would have the additional benefit of increasing democratic 
transparency in the states. 
1. Echoes of the First Two Phases 
The Court‘s choice-of-law decisions in Phase Three echo some of the 
themes from Phases One and Two, and are thus subject to the same 
critiques. While Phase Two had its excesses, its conceptual framework 
was sound; part of the problem with Phase Three is the re-introduction of 
mistakes from Phase One. The Court should abandon these mistakes and 
return to a moderated version of Phase Two. 
Before Hanna, the Supreme Court inaugurated the practice of adopting 
implausibly narrow readings of Federal Rules in order to apply state law 
instead.
191
 This practice has returned in Phase Three.
192
 The practice is 
especially pernicious when a more natural reading of the Rule continues to 
be applied in federal question cases, so that the same language in the same 
Rule means two different things depending on the basis for federal 
jurisdiction. Even Justice Stevens‘s retail approach in Shady Grove would 
be an improvement, if it entailed frank acknowledgement that the Rule 
was being found invalid as applied rather than disingenuously distorted.
193
 
This conceptual improvement, however, would not solve the problem 
of excessive discretion by the federal courts. The retail approach means 
having federal judges decide in every case whether a state‘s true motive 
for its law is substantive or procedural, a more difficult task than the 
already difficult one of classifying an actual rule or law as such. Each case 
would also involve a Byrd-like weighing of those state interests against 
any federal interests at stake.
194
 In contrast, the approach of the Shady 
Grove plurality could mark the end of Phase Three and a return to the 
conceptual structure of Phase Two, although ideally with a less aggressive 
approach to defining the sweep of Federal Rules. As discussed below, this 
 
 
 191. See, e.g., Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); see also 
supra Part I.A. 
 192. See supra Parts I.C.2 and I.C.3 (discussing Semtek and Shady Grove). 
 193. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Insur. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 123–28. 
 194. This is not to say that Byrd should be abandoned in the unguided Erie context, or that Byrd-
like concerns cannot be relevant even in the REA context. See Freer & Arthur, supra note 34, at 102 
(arguing that the policies reflected in Byrd pervade both RDA and REA analysis). Rather, it is to 
suggest that federal courts should not have to engage in Byrd-like balancing every time they apply a 
Federal Rule in a diversity case where local practice would differ. 
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return would best be served by taking the wholesale, rather than the retail, 
approach to the Rules themselves. 
2. Separating Substance and Procedure to Improve State Lawmaking 
While Phase Two may have gone too far, it was conceptually the right 
approach, and the Shady Grove plurality is right about how the validity of 
Rules should be evaluated. Many of the pros and cons of the wholesale 
and retail approaches have been debated elsewhere.
195
 Here, I focus on one 
argument for the wholesale approach that has been neglected and that 
directly answers one of the main concerns of those on the retail side. 
A primary theoretical argument on the retail side is respect for 
democratic enactments in the states. This Part shows, however, that 
adhering to federal procedures can be beneficial to state-level democracy, 
because it forces state lawmakers to make their policy preferences clear 
through the substantive law rather than masking preferences through 
specialized procedure. This justification for wholesale, rather than retail, 
federal procedure gains support from the observations of several theorists 
who have, from a variety of perspectives, analyzed the relationship 
between substance and procedure in light of democratic norms.
196
 
Moreover, at least in recent years, this justification is consistent with 
congressional action manifesting a desire to maintain the federal courts as 
a procedurally independent forum for litigating state law claims.
197
 
A wholesale approach to the Federal Rules has the potential to improve 
state lawmaking by forcing state lawmakers to be more open and 
transparent with respect to substantive goals. The fact that state law claims 
will be adjudicated under federal procedures reduces the ability of state 
lawmakers to say, with Representative Dingell, ―I‘ll let you write the 
substance . . . you let me write the procedure, and I‘ll screw you every 
time.‖198 Dingell‘s statement reflects the fact that a substantive goal can 
 
 
 195. See Ely, supra note 1, at 733–34 (outlining and endorsing the retail approach); see also Shady 
Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1440–48 (endorsing the wholesale approach and criticizing the retail approach 
used by the dissent and concurrence). 
 196. See infra text accompanying notes 200–31. 
 197. See infra text accompanying notes 237–40. 
 198. Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and 
Governmental Regulations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of 
Rep. John Dingell). In many states, state lawmakers may be less sophisticated than Congress in their 
ability to manipulate substance through procedure. Many state legislatures are part-time and lack the 
staff and other resources to carry through on a boast like Representative Dingell‘s. That reality, 
however, strengthens the argument made in the text. State legislators who lack such resources are more 
vulnerable to the influence of lobbying and may support seemingly innocuous procedural reforms 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/3
  
 
 
 
 
2011] SUBSTANCE–PROCEDURE DICHOTOMY 139 
 
 
 
 
easily be undermined by imposing procedural hurdles. Substantive 
entitlements are visible to the public when it assesses the government‘s 
work, while procedural mechanisms are more arcane, difficult to 
understand, and usually transsubstantive. When lawmakers tinker with 
procedure on a substance-specific basis, they often do so in order to 
modify substantive rights de facto, even if the substantive right remains 
formally unchanged. 
Many will regard the lawmaker‘s ability to fine tune substantive rights 
through procedural mechanisms as a good thing. Legislatures retain 
ultimate control over many aspects of procedure in part because of the 
close connection between substance and procedure. Indeed, the notion of a 
dichotomy between the two categories is relatively recent.
199
 Nonetheless, 
that dichotomy now lies at the root of the litigation framework that has 
been created by Congress and that is contemplated by diversity 
jurisdiction, the RDA as interpreted in Erie and its progeny, and the REA. 
My argument here is that this dichotomy is not necessarily a usurpation of 
state legislative prerogatives, but instead can enhance the democratic 
legitimacy of state substantive law. While substance and procedure may be 
inextricably intertwined, there is still value in trying to separate them. 
Other commentators have argued that separating substance from 
procedure can promote democratic values.
200
 Their analyses have focused 
on concerns that some of the Federal Rules are ―too substantive‖ and thus 
improperly alter substantive rights under state and federal law alike.
201
 
This Article takes no position on where the substance–procedure line 
should be drawn for purposes of the REA, except that the line should be 
drawn wholesale rather than retail. However, the democratic problems 
created by an over-reaching judiciary that uses procedure improperly to 
affect substance are similar in kind to those of a legislature that does the 
same. The same theoretical points thus support the idea that adherence to 
the Federal Rules in federal court is no insult to the democratic processes 
or lawmaking authority of the states. 
 
 
without realizing their substantive effects. The lawmakers themselves may be in the same position as 
the general public when it comes to the opaqueness of procedure. 
 199. Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801, 
804–10 (2010) (describing how the concept of substance and procedure as a dichotomy emerged along 
with the convergence of law and equity and coincided with the early development of courts in the 
United States). 
 200. See infra text accompanying notes 202–16, 220–26 (discussing work by Martin Redish and 
JoEllen Lind). 
 201. See, e.g., Lind, supra note 28; Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic 
Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
71 [hereinafter Redish, Class Actions]. 
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Martin Redish‘s work contains the most explicit and extensive 
discussion of the democratic implications of manipulating procedure in 
order to affect substance in the context of purely federal law.
202
 Professor 
Redish argues that a legislature has a duty to be forthright about the 
substantive rights it enacts into law. As part of that duty, the legislature 
cannot create opaque procedural requirements that effectively undermine 
the rights proclaimed by the substantive law: ―For example, in formally 
adopting ‗standard A‘ as a general rule of decision, while simultaneously 
requiring the federal courts to reach decisions that effectively amount to 
adoption of ‗standard B‘ or ‗standard ―not A,‖‘ Congress has substantially 
subverted the representational democratic process.‖203 Professor Redish 
argues that this sort of legislative deception could violate both the 
procedural due process rights of litigants and the separation of powers.
204
 
An example where procedural rights might be violated is Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act. Deborah Brake and Joanna Grossman have 
demonstrated that the remedial scheme established under Title VII is so 
burdensome on claimants, so unforgiving about its short deadlines, and so 
poorly designed as a response to the real-life experience of discrimination 
that Congress has failed to protect the substantive rights purportedly 
created by Title VII.
205
 While Congress may or may not have been under a 
duty to create those substantive rights, it claims to have created them and 
reaps the political benefit of having done so. If it has encumbered those 
substantive rights with such a defective enforcement mechanism that they 
effectively do not exist for a substantial portion of people, then perhaps, 
under Professor Redish‘s theory, Congress has violated the Due Process 
Clause by purporting to create a substantive right but then making it 
overly burdensome to vindicate that right. 
Separation of powers is a more salient concern when Congress forces 
the courts to employ Orwellian double-speak. Professor Redish, with 
Christopher Pudelski, argues that the Supreme Court implicitly recognized 
 
 
 202. See Redish, Class Actions, supra note 201; Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial 
Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697 (1995) [hereinafter 
Redish, Federal Judicial Independence]; Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative 
Deception, Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of 
United States v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437 (2006) [hereinafter Redish & Pudelski, Legislative 
Deception].  
 203. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence, supra note 202, at 715. 
 204. Id. at 716. 
 205. Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming 
System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2008). That Brake & Grossman‘s thesis is an example of Redish‘s point 
is pointed out in Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a 
Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1557–58 (2008). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/3
  
 
 
 
 
2011] SUBSTANCE–PROCEDURE DICHOTOMY 141 
 
 
 
 
this problem in United States v. Klein.
206
 Klein involved the ability of 
Southerners to reclaim property lost during the Civil War.
207
 To prevail, a 
claimant had to have remained loyal to the United States.
208
 The Supreme 
Court had held that receipt of a presidential pardon constituted proof of 
loyalty.
209
 Congress had sought to reverse that presumption, declaring that 
a pardon should instead be taken as proof of disloyalty.
210
 In Klein, the 
Supreme Court struck down the presumption, but the precise reason for 
doing so is not clear from the opinion. The statute drew into question not 
only the independence of the judiciary in determining the evidentiary 
significance of a particular fact but also the scope of the president‘s pardon 
power.
211
 Redish and Pudelski make a convincing argument that concerns 
about legislative deception were part of the mix.
212
 Professor Redish has 
argued that the same concerns should have led to a different outcome in 
Michael H. v. Gerald G., in which the Supreme Court upheld California‘s 
marital presumption of paternity, rejecting the parental claims of the 
genetic father in favor of the mother‘s husband.213 Having promised the 
public that ―loyal‖ Southerners would reclaim their property and that 
―fathers‖ would have legal rights as parents, the legislature could not 
require the courts to make a mockery of language by following 
presumptions that forced the opposite conclusions. Professor Redish 
argues, ―Under separation-of-powers principles, this congressional action 
is defective, because it effectively enlists the federal judiciary in a scheme 
to bring about voter confusion.‖214 
Professor Redish‘s argument is a difficult one where the deceptive 
procedural requirement is created by the same legislature that has power 
over the substantive law. Even opaque procedural statutes are public and 
open to inspection. And lawyers, at least, are accustomed to the occasional 
counterintuitive presumption or definition. If ―substance‖ and ―procedure‖ 
are merely labels that attach to conclusions, why not ―father‖ and ―loyal‖? 
Moreover, in each of Professor Redish‘s examples, the legislative 
presumption is reasonably defensible. Pardons are usually granted to 
 
 
 206. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871), which is discussed in Redish & 
Pudelski, Legislative Deception, supra note 202. 
 207. Klein, 80 U.S. at 132. 
 208. Klein, 80 U.S. at 131–32. 
 209. Klein, 80 U.S. at 142. 
 210. Klein, 80 U.S. at 143–44. 
 211. Klein, 80 U.S. at 148. 
 212. Redish & Pudelski, Legislative Deception, supra note 202, at 447–51. 
 213. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence, supra note 202, at 716–17. 
 214. Id. at 716. 
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people who have, in fact, done something wrong, and an admission of 
guilt is sometimes required. Congress may have been justifiably outraged 
that pardons were being used to deem people ―loyal‖ for purposes of its 
compensation scheme. Similarly, marriage to a child‘s mother has 
historically been the crux of legal and social fatherhood.
215
 The marital 
presumption in Michael H. could be mocked only because of fairly recent 
technology allowing for the identification of a genetic father. It is difficult 
to pinpoint when a legislative presumption would become so absurd that it 
would violate the separation of powers to force the courts to speak in the 
legislature‘s terms. 
Professor Redish acknowledges that it would be difficult to say when a 
procedural statute goes so far in deceiving the public about the substantive 
content of the law that a court should strike it down.
216
 For purposes of my 
claim, however, that line need not be drawn. I do not suggest that state 
laws be struck down as unconstitutional for intermingling substance and 
procedure. Rather, I argue that federal courts should recognize that 
adhering to a uniform system of federal procedure can benefit democratic 
process in the states, even when displacing state procedure affects 
substantive outcomes. Protecting procedure from the legislature prevents 
lawmakers from engaging in the sort of deception that Professor Redish 
criticizes. 
In a similar vein, Linda Mullenix has argued that maintaining 
independent procedures is necessary for a well-functioning independent 
judiciary.
217
 Her focus is on Congress‘s increasingly frequent interventions 
in federal procedure over the past thirty years.
218
 Professor Mullenix 
decries the resulting politicization of federal procedure as it is created 
through legislative rather than judicial institutions.
219
 The same 
phenomenon can occur at the state level. If it does, state courts, drawing 
on either Redish‘s or Mullenix‘s ideas, might decide that their prerogatives 
have been invaded and strike down excessive legislative interference with 
 
 
 215. Nancy E. Dowd, From Genes, Marriage and Money to Nurture: Redefining Fatherhood, 10 
CARDOZO WOMEN‘S L.J. 132, 132 (2003) (―Largely in the name of gender equality and to some extent 
in the name of children‘s rights, we have moved from a legal definition of fatherhood linked to 
marriage towards a legal definition of fatherhood linked to genes.‖). 
 216. Redish & Pudelski, Legislative Deception, supra note 202, at 457–58 (describing five 
difficult questions about the model of legislative deception, including ―[I]f it is conceded that all 
procedural and evidentiary rules may in some sense impact the substantive rights being enforced, why 
disapprove of such a connection only in certain contexts?‖). 
 217. Linda S. Mullenix, Judicial Power and the Rules Enabling Act, 46 MERCER L. REV. 733, 734 
(1995) (―A judiciary that cannot create its own procedural rules is not an independent judiciary.‖). 
 218. Id. at 735–36. 
 219. Id. at 754–55. 
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procedure as a matter of state separation of powers. Even without such 
drastic action, however, the existence of federal diversity jurisdiction can 
check the ability of state legislators to manipulate substance through 
procedure. 
Professor Redish‘s theory described above is concerned with legislators 
using procedure to subvert substance. Professor Redish and others have 
also expressed concern about judges doing the same thing.
220
 JoEllen Lind 
terms this phenomenon ―procedural Swift‖ and accuses the federal courts, 
jointly with Congress, of manipulating procedure to undermine state 
substantive law.
221
 Professor Redish has also argued that courts wrongly 
use procedure to transform substantive law.
222
 Interestingly, Lind and 
Redish both point to class action procedure as a prime example, but from 
opposite perspectives. Professor Lind argues that the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005
223
 and stringent federal standards for certification 
permit defendants to remove to federal court and thereby avoid legitimate 
enforcement of state law through class mechanisms.
224
 Congress, she 
argues, should not ―use complex litigation to hide law reform that could 
not gain public approval if its consequences were better known.‖225 
Professor Redish, in contrast, argues that the judicial invention and 
liberalization of class actions to make feasible certain claims that would 
not otherwise be brought is an illegitimate departure from legislative 
expectations.
226
 
This difference between Lind and Redish on class actions is a matter of 
baselines. As David Shapiro has pointed out, the availability or non-
availability of class actions affects enforcement of substantive law, but this 
fact does not tell us what the default rule should be.
227
 More generally, 
 
 
 220. See, e.g., Lear, supra note 165, at 1152 (―This Article takes the position that the Court must 
abandon the forum non conveniens doctrine as an unconstitutional usurpation of congressional 
power.‖); Lind, supra note 28; Redish, Federal Judicial Independence, supra note 202.  
 221. Lind, supra note 28, at 719 (―Procedural Swift . . . is the strategy of creating federal tort law 
through the guise of regulating procedure.‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 222. See Redish, Class Actions, supra note 201, at 73–74. 
 223. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (making several 
changes to class action procedure, including provisions making it much easier for defendants to 
remove large class actions to federal court). 
 224. See Lind, supra note 28, at 754 (suggesting that the goal of various federal procedural 
reforms ―is to curtail mass tort class actions altogether by redirecting them to the federal forum where 
they will be obstructed so profoundly that defendants‘ overall liability will be reduced.‖). 
 225. Id. at 719. 
 226. Redish, Class Actions, supra note 201, at 73–77. 
 227. Shapiro, supra note 104, at 957 (―[E]ven one who takes a broader view than I do of the scope 
of judicial rulemaking power should, I believe, balk at the use of that power either to endorse or to 
reject the entity theory [of class actions] advanced here.‖). 
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Thomas Main argues that substantive law is always premised on the 
procedural system that legislators assume will be used to enforce it.
228
 Any 
change in procedures will affect the balance of deterrence contemplated 
when the law was enacted.
229
 Professor Main concludes with two proposed 
solutions to the problem of ―mismatch‖ between procedures when a court 
applies foreign law. First, when a court applies foreign law, it should apply 
as much foreign law, both substantive and procedural, as possible; 
legislatures, in turn, should intermingle substance with specially tailored 
procedure to a greater extent than they do now. Second, at the policy level, 
courts should strive to harmonize procedure across jurisdictions.
230
 
In the domestic choice-of-law context in federal courts, both 
administrative and theoretical considerations favor Professor Main‘s 
second solution over his first. Administratively, federal courts should not 
be required to adopt large chunks of the procedural devices of the fifty 
states while simultaneously operating under the uniform Federal Rules. 
Moreover, procedure changes over time, and fidelity to Professor Main‘s 
goal of fulfilling legislative expectations would require courts to discover 
and apply the procedures that existed at the time each substantive rule was 
adopted. Theoretically, as discussed above, uniform procedure requires 
legislatures to pursue their substantive goals more transparently. 
In addition, Professor Main‘s claim that changes in procedure wrongly 
interfere with legislative expectations rests heavily on a deterrence theory 
of lawmaking.
231
 While many lawmakers may operate from that 
perspective, the public may expect the substantive law to mean what it 
says in every case, not just as a matter of probabilities and enforcement 
rates. Only people who have been through at least one year of law school 
are likely to be comfortable answering the question ―Isn‘t that illegal?‖ 
with ―Yes, but nothing is meant to be done about it.‖ 
The approach advocated in this Article puts some burden on state 
lawmakers to be familiar with federal judicial procedures and perhaps 
even to amend substantive law occasionally to keep pace with evolving 
procedural law. As long as we are satisfied that ―procedural law,‖ as 
embodied in the Federal Rules and in the federal courts‘ use of inherent 
authority, is sufficiently procedural, this is not too much to ask of 
 
 
 228. Main, supra note 199, at 802. 
 229. Id. at 823–25. 
 230. Id. at 838–40. Professor Main also advises courts to be humble and skeptical about their 
ability to apply foreign law. Id. at 838. 
 231. See id. at 823–25 (describing legislation as calibrated to achieve a particular level of 
deterrence). 
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legislators. Congress unquestionably has the power to determine federal 
procedure and to confer diversity jurisdiction.
232
 By following uniform, 
transsubstantive procedure, the federal courts may deprive state lawmakers 
of the ability to modify their own substantive creations through substance-
specific procedures. Democratic theory suggests that this result may not be 
a bad thing. 
Consider the contrary assumption that has animated the Supreme 
Court‘s jurisprudence in Phase Three. In Gasperini, the Court seemed 
almost to feel guilty about the existence of the Seventh Amendment as a 
constraint on federal courts.
233
 It reasoned as if state legislators enact their 
laws in a state-only bubble and the entire burden of figuring out how to 
carry out their wishes in diversity cases must fall on the federal courts. 
State legislators, however, should be assumed to be aware of diversity 
jurisdiction, and there is nothing wrong with expecting them to take it into 
account. If Congress had considered a statute similar to the New York law 
at issue in Gasperini, the Seventh Amendment would surely have been a 
topic of discussion; New York legislators should have had the same 
conversation. 
Consider also the state laws at issue in Shady Grove. The substantive 
law proclaimed that insurance companies would be liable for a 2 percent 
penalty if they failed to pay claims in a timely fashion.
234
 Perhaps, when 
this law was enacted, legislators and insurers alike knew that it would 
rarely be enforced: the cost of litigation would outweigh the potential 
recovery in individual actions, and the state prohibition on penalty class 
actions would prevent aggregation.
235
 The availability of class actions in 
federal court changed that, leading to far more efficient enforcement of the 
substantive right proclaimed on the face of the statute. Now, perhaps, as a 
matter of regulatory policy, this outcome overdeters: it makes insurance 
companies rush their payments too much, or it imposes liability out of 
proportion to their moral culpability, or it makes too many campaign 
contributors unhappy. If that is so, the legislature should change the 
substantive law. This outcome is preferable to keeping the same law—
promising ordinary citizens that they are protected by this penalty—but 
disabling the courts from enforcing it. If the legislature says that insurance 
 
 
 232. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 91–92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the result) (―[N]o one doubts federal power over procedure.‖). 
 233. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996); see also supra Part I.C.1 
(describing the Supreme Court‘s accommodation of state law in Gasperini). 
 234. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Insur. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (2010). 
 235. Cf. Main, supra note 199, at 823–25 (arguing that legislators enact substantive law against a 
backdrop of procedures they assume will apply). 
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companies should pay 2 percent penalties, courts are entitled to assume 
that the legislature actually wants this to happen. They should adopt 
procedures that achieve this result in as ―just, speedy, and inexpensive‖ a 
fashion as possible.
236
 Separating substance from procedure, artificial as it 
may be in some senses, has the virtue of requiring the legislature to speak 
as clearly as possible in the substantive law. 
This separation of substance and procedure is also consistent with 
congressional action from the REA to the present. Although Congress 
initially recognized the importance of state substantive law by enacting the 
RDA, since 1938 it has regularly expressed a preference for independent 
federal procedure.
237
 That preference has become so pronounced in recent 
years that it prompted Geoffrey Hazard to ask, ―Has the Erie doctrine been 
repealed by Congress?‖238 Hazard argues that the judicial system 
envisioned by Congress is best described as follows: ―State law is the 
substantive basis of the American legal system, displaced only selectively 
by federal substantive law. The federal court system, however, provides 
the premier American model of the judiciary and, as such, is called upon 
to administer its form of justice in legal disputes.‖239 In statutes like the 
Class Action Fairness Act, Congress has expressed its view that, ―in 
certain types of cases, the judicious administration of state law is better 
entrusted to federal courts.‖240 
The dichotomy between substance and procedure may be artificial and 
thus difficult to define and maintain. It is nonetheless a dichotomy that 
Congress has placed at the foundation of the federal judicial system and 
that serves important functions in that system. In Erie‘s Third Phase, a 
shifting plurality of the Supreme Court has begun to break down that 
dichotomy, apparently in the name of state democratic processes. State-
level democracy, however, does not need this solicitude. Just as the courts 
are frequently at pains to ascertain and apply state substantive law, state 
lawmakers can reasonably be expected to ascertain federal procedural law, 
and to plan accordingly. If they do so, uniform federal procedure will not 
stand in the way of their substantive goals. Moreover, state law will gain 
in democratic legitimacy and transparency because lawmakers will be 
 
 
 236. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 237. Hazard, supra note 129, at 1639 (describing a ―long history of interaction between state and 
federal courts in which different procedures have applied and in which federal procedure has often 
trumped that of the state‖). 
 238. Id. at 1629 (title). 
 239. Id. at 1630. 
 240. Id. at 1629; see also supra note 211 and accompanying text (describing the Class Action 
Fairness Act). 
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prevented from manipulating procedure in ways that undermine the 
apparent goals of substantive law. 
III. ENDING PHASE THREE 
Phase Three of Erie is characterized by discretionary lawmaking by the 
federal courts. This discretion is claimed for the seemingly self-effacing 
purpose of accommodating state policies. As it turns out, however, state-
level lawmaking would likely fare just as well or better in the face of 
uniform federal procedure. Fortunately, Phase Three is so far strictly a 
Supreme Court phenomenon, and the decisions in Gasperini and Semtek 
can and should be contained. This Part sketches a plan for construing those 
cases narrowly and bringing an end to Phase Three of Erie. 
A. The Third Phase Has No Traction in the Lower Courts 
Lower federal courts have routinely cited Gasperini and, to a lesser 
extent, Semtek as the Supreme Court‘s most recent articulation of Erie 
principles.
241
 The lower courts have not, however, emulated the Supreme 
Court‘s Phase-Three approach by creating their own accommodations of 
state policy. Instead, they have continued to give ―yes‖ or ―no‖ answers to 
Erie questions. Phase Three can therefore be contained as a Supreme 
Court frolic that has not yet taken root in general federal practice. 
Lower courts are presumably more sensitive than the Supreme Court to 
the dangers of inviting litigants not only to argue for or against the 
application of state or federal law but also to suggest novel 
accommodations of the interests embodied in each. Perhaps for this 
reason, I have found only one lower court decision that even considered 
following the Phase Three strategy. In Houben v. Telular, the Seventh 
Circuit reviewed the leading Erie cases in detail and then commented, ―It 
seems possible to us, in light of the substantive policy . . . and in keeping 
with Gasperini‘s approach, that state substantive interests and federal 
procedural rules might be capable of accommodation.‖242 After a short 
 
 
 241. See, e.g., Rucker v. Oasis Legal Finance, L.L.C., 632 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(citing Gasperini); Godin v. Schenks, 629 F.3d 79, 85, 89 n.16 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing both); 
Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 624 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Semtek); Biegas v. 
Quickway Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gasperini); In re Ark-La-Tex 
Timber Co., 482 F.3d 319, 330 n. 12 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Semtek); Stamathis v. Flying J, Inc., 389 
F.3d 429, 438 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Gasperini); Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 761 
(9th Cir. 2003) (citing Gasperini). Semtek appears to be cited by the lower courts primarily in cases 
raising issues of preclusion rather than as part of the general framework for Erie questions. 
 242. Houben v. Telular Corp., 309 F.3d 1028, 1038 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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discussion of that possibility, however, the court concluded that the 
accommodation was ―too much of a strain‖ and decided not to apply state 
law at all.
243
 This reluctance to follow the Gasperini path bodes well for 
ending the Third Phase before it takes hold beyond the Supreme Court. 
B. Containing Semtek 
In Semtek, the Supreme Court may have had a legitimate reason for 
creating federal common law based on its inherent power over procedure 
in the federal courts.
244
 The Court, however, was not transparent about 
how it got there. The best way of limiting its effect in the future is to 
confine its holding to the particular circumstances of the case—the 
preclusive effect of a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds—rather 
than to construe it as a general statement about preclusion. 
The most serious difficulty posed by Semtek was its suggestion that 
preclusion is, as a general matter, a substantive realm that is beyond the 
reach of the REA.
245
 Other Federal Rules regulate matters that bear on 
preclusion, such as permissive and compulsory joinder.
246
 If read to deal 
generally with preclusion, Semtek calls into question the validity of those 
Rules as they are generally understood and applied.
247
 Instead, Semtek 
should be construed as primarily a statute of limitations case, rather than a 
preclusion case. At the next opportunity, the Court could clarify that 
matters such as joinder, including the preclusive effects of failing to join a 
compulsory claim, are within the scope of the REA. 
While this approach is, admittedly, not the best reading of the Semtek 
decision, it is at least plausible. Patrick Woolley has already shown how to 
―save‖ federal preclusion rules from Semtek using the back door that the 
Court left open for ensuring the preclusive effect of dismissal as a 
sanction.
248
 Recall Semtek‘s holding: the preclusive effect of a diversity 
judgment is governed by federal common law; to determine the content of 
that federal common law, courts should borrow from the preclusion law of 
 
 
 243. Houben, 309 F.3d at 1039. 
 244. Semtek Int‘l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001); see also supra Part I.C.2. 
 245. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508. 
 246. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13. 
 247. See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 724 (Semtek ―preserves the validity of Rule 
41(b), but only at the expense of casting doubt on other Federal Rules, notably Rule 13(a) on 
compulsory counterclaims and Rule 23 on class actions, which presumably determine the preclusive 
effect of any resulting judgment.‖). But see Burbank & Wolff, supra note 103, at 50 (stating that Rule 
13 could ―be used to support the application of federal common law of preclusion‖ only if ―justified by 
its non-preclusion policies‖). 
 248. Woolley, supra note 94, at 529–32. 
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the forum state, unless federal interests demand a different rule.
249
 The 
stated reason for the final caveat was the remote possibility of a state 
failing to accord preclusive effect to dismissals that sanction a party.
250
 
Professor Woolley, however, points out that strong federal interests are 
also at stake in a variety of other aspects of the preclusion analysis, such as 
joinder, whether claims are compulsory, and when a judgment becomes 
final.
251
 Again, all of these federal interests are procedural interests, 
properly governed through the REA and/or the inherent powers of the 
courts. In Professor Woolley‘s assessment, only statutes of limitations and 
questions of privity fail to trigger sufficient federal interests to warrant 
uniform federal treatment.
252
 
This re-reading of Semtek remains possible because the Semtek Court 
did not firmly commit itself to the position that Rule 41(b) would be 
invalid if construed to have preclusive effect.
253
 Its suggestion of that 
possibility should be read in the context of a statute of limitations analysis. 
Statutes of limitations have a unique place in Erie jurisprudence. It was a 
statute of limitations that first drove the Court, in Guaranty Trust, to try to 
articulate a test for when state law controlled in a diversity case.
254
 Once 
established, federal respect for state statutes of limitations contributed to 
the excess of the First Phase in Ragan.
255
 Semtek should be seen as part of 
this pattern rather than as establishing a general rule for preclusion 
questions. 
Under this approach, Semtek becomes the exception to a general rule 
that the preclusive effect of a federal judgment is a matter of federal 
procedural law. Rules of preclusion ―really regulate procedure‖ and are 
thus properly addressed in the Federal Rules. However, a few aspects of 
preclusion law—statutes of limitations, perhaps privity—are sufficiently 
substantive to warrant restrained interpretation of the Rules and are 
substantive for Erie purposes, so that state law applies if the Federal Rules 
do not. Importantly, the conclusion that these issues are substantive is a 
 
 
 249. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508–09. 
 250. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 509. 
 251. Woolley, supra note 94, at 532; see also Erichson, supra note 144, at 1003 (pointing out that 
―nearly all preclusion rules are transsubstantive‖).  
 252. Woolley, supra note 94, at 529 (arguing that ―neither the Erie policy nor the REA prevents 
recognition of the very strong federal interest in uniform federal rules of preclusion with respect to all 
but a handful of issues‖). 
 253. See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 506. 
 254. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); see also supra text accompanying notes 65–
69. 
 255. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 65–69. 
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wholesale, not a retail, determination. One can say that ―joinder‖ is 
properly deemed procedural and governed by the law of the court that 
hears the case, while ―privity‖ or ―statutes of limitations‖ are best 
governed by the law-supplying state without inquiring into what laws any 
particular state has adopted in these matters.
256
  
In the alternative, the Court could adhere to the view suggested in 
Semtek that preclusion is, in general, too substantive for the REA; perhaps 
the Court would reach this conclusion in the course of adopting a more 
rigorous approach to the REA than the ―really regulates procedure‖ test. 
The problem with Semtek, of course, is that the Supreme Court adhered to 
that view only for the first half of the opinion. To be consistent, the Court 
should have refrained from claiming inherent power over a matter it had 
already cast as too substantive for the REA. The Court therefore should 
have held that it was bound to follow state preclusion law not by federal 
common law of its own creation but by the RDA. While I believe it would 
be preferable to recognize most questions of preclusion as procedural for 
REA purposes,
257
 what is untenable is for the Court to claim inherent 
procedural power while at the same time declaring the matter beyond the 
reach of the REA.   
 
 
 256. The one major problem not addressed by this reading of Semtek is that even the new reading 
retains the dual interpretation of Rule 41(b). The Rule means little or nothing in diversity cases but is 
still understood to govern preclusion in federal question cases. The problem of duel interpretations 
originated in Phase Two, not in Semtek. One way of dealing with this problem is to distinguish true 
interpretations of the Rules from judicial ―glosses‖ on the Rules, in which the courts fill in the 
interstices of the Rules. A true interpretation would govern in a diversity case, but a ―gloss‖ might give 
way to state law if it were substantive for RDA purposes. See supra note 43 (discussing this strategy 
for dealing with dual-interpretation cases). Short of flat-out overruling all the cases in which it has 
occurred, the best thing that the Court can do is to just stop doing it, as it could have done in Semtek: 
The most natural way to read Rule 41(b) is as a default rule for determining whether a federal court‘s 
judgment was intended to be on the merits. A simple way out of the Semtek problem would have been 
to hold that the plaintiff should have requested that the judgment be issued ―without prejudice‖ 
because California law, made applicable through the RDA, required as much. The district court‘s 
refusal to do so could have been addressed on direct appeal. The Supreme Court‘s decision in Semtek 
acknowledged this possible sequence of events in footnotes, Semtek, 531 U.S. at 506 n.2, but oddly 
suggested that the plaintiff‘s failure to pursue the matter on direct appeal required that it be dealt with 
in the subsequent case, rather than simply being defaulted. Id. 
 257. See generally Erichson, supra note 144, at 1002–03 (arguing that the best rule is to apply the 
preclusion law of the jurisdiction that rendered the original judgment); Tobias Barrington Wolff, 
Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 760 (2005) (explaining that the 
rendering court can have great influence on future preclusive application of its judgment, even though 
it cannot purport to declare the judgment‘s applicability to future hypothetical cases). 
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C. Containing  Gasperini 
The flaws in Gasperini are easier to confine to the circumstances of 
that case. The Gasperini Court presented the case as if it could formulate, 
not merely apply or not apply, New York law.
258
 More specifically, the 
Court indulged two errors in its approach. First, the Gasperini Court 
neglected the original point of Erie: that state common law rules are, like 
state statutes, ―laws‖ under the RDA. Second, faced with what it deemed a 
substantive New York law in conflict with the federal Constitution, the 
Court should have used ordinary severability analysis (rather than its own 
discretionary balancing of state and federal interests) to determine what 
law to apply. 
First, the description of Gasperini in Part I.C.1 follows the Court and 
most commentators in describing the issue as whether the New York 
statute on appellate review of damages applied in federal court. The 
Supreme Court concluded that the statute was sufficiently substantive to 
warrant application under Erie, but also that it conflicted with the Seventh 
Amendment obligations of the federal courts. To read the body of the 
Court‘s opinion, the Syllabus, and many other synopses of the holding, 
one would think that the Supreme Court itself came up with the 
compromise of accommodating state policy by having the trial court, 
rather than the appellate court, perform the damages review.
259
 
The problem with this description is that not one but two New York 
laws were relevant in Gasperini. The first was the statute, which required 
review of damages by appellate courts.
260
 Second, as the Court briefly 
acknowledged in its background section but then ignored for the rest of the 
opinion, the common law of New York required damages review by trial 
courts under the same standard.
261
 Erie says that both the statute and the 
common law are ―laws.‖262 While the New York statute conflicted with 
the Seventh Amendment and therefore could not apply in federal court, the 
common law did not conflict with the Seventh Amendment and could 
 
 
 258. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 259. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 419 (majority opinion) (holding that ―New York‘s law . . . can be 
given effect, without detriment to the Seventh Amendment, if the review standard set out in CPLR 
§ 5501(c) is applied by the federal trial court judge‖); id. at 415 (Syllabus by the clerk of court) 
(stating the same); Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 707. 
 260. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 423 n.4 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c)). 
 261. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 425 (noting that the ―deviates materially‖ standard, as construed by 
New York‘s courts, instructs state trial judges as well). Whether this rule is considered pure common 
law or a judicial expansion of the statute, the fact remains that the Supreme Court‘s analysis ignored 
New York judicial opinions as a controlling source of state law. 
 262. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77–78 (1938). 
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therefore apply.
263
 There was no need for creativity, accommodation, or 
other interest balancing by the Supreme Court. 
Unfortunately, the Gasperini Court ignored the state‘s common law 
rule and treated only the statute as ―law‖ that might apply in federal 
court.
264
 This raises the question: what if the common law rule had been 
different? That is, New York must have some legal standard for when a 
trial court can revise a jury verdict.
265
 If that standard had happened to 
differ from the standard prescribed by statute for appellate courts, the 
Supreme Court‘s freelancing on how to ―accommodate‖ the statute would 
have ended up paradoxically displacing another state law. Gasperini did 
not call for the Supreme Court to make up a federal common law of New 
York damages because New York already had a common law of damages. 
Second, in formulating its own accommodation of the statute, the 
Supreme Court neglected the ordinary task of a court faced with a law that 
is constitutional in part. Once the Court determined that the New York 
statute represented a substantive policy choice under Erie, the next step 
was to apply the statute. Faced with a Seventh Amendment barrier, it 
should have done just what a New York court would have done, if the 
Seventh Amendment had the same effect in state court: asked if the statute 
was entirely unconstitutional or if some part of it could be saved by a 
severability analysis. The severability analysis—under New York 
severability rules, of course—may well have yielded the resolution that the 
Court reached on its own. Whether it did or not, the decision would have 
been better reached by the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation rather 
than the Court‘s own creative process. The correct question was not ―What 
kind of accommodation can we make between state and federal interests?‖ 
but ―What would a New York court do, faced with this statute and a 
constitutional barrier to applying it in full?‖ 
An approach that focused on statutory interpretation would also be 
superior because it would have a better chance of revealing the actual 
legislative intent behind the New York statute, which is likely to bear on 
the initial classification of the law as substantive or procedural. When 
legislatures enact tort reform measures that implicate procedure, there is 
nothing wrong with expecting them to know that state tort cases are 
 
 
 263. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431–33. 
 264. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426–31 (discussing the case as if only the statutory direction to 
appellate courts were at issue). 
 265. See Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism, supra note 28 (manuscript at 41–42) (pointing 
out that there is always state law on point, whether statutory law, case law, or an Erie guess about what 
the state‘s highest court would do if presented with the question). 
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litigated in both state and federal courts. New laws must therefore be 
consistent with federal requirements for there to be a chance that they will 
be fully enforced. Thus, there was no reason for the Supreme Court to 
tiptoe around the inconvenient fact of the Seventh Amendment. 
There is nothing incongruous about the New York statute producing 
different review procedures in state and federal cases. That difference is a 
function not of the substance/procedure distinction but of the Seventh 
Amendment‘s status as one of a very few unincorporated rights.266 The 
New York legislature can anticipate the operation of the federal 
Constitution in federal court just as well as it can anticipate the operation 
of the state constitution in state court. Although the statute was apparently 
consistent with New York constitutional requirements, there is nothing 
wrong with expecting New York legislators to anticipate Seventh 
Amendment problems. If those legislators believed they were enacting 
substantive policy that would apply in federal court, they should have 
accommodated federal constitutional constraints. On the other hand, a 
severability analysis grounded in legislative intent might have uncovered 
that the legislature‘s concern was with excessive or widely varying 
verdicts in local trials presided over by local, elected judges. There may 
have been little concern about federal juries under federal judges. Since 
the Supreme Court saw the statute itself as sounding in both substance and 
procedure, it would have been worth asking at this point whether the 
legislature‘s goal was to change the substantive law applied in all courts or 
to correct for procedural biases in the state court system.
267
 
It is unfortunate that the Court framed Gasperini as if its task were to 
create a federal common law of New York tort damages. The Court likely 
would have reached the same result by respecting New York common law 
as much as it respected the New York statute, or even by performing a 
severability analysis, but it would have kept the lines of authority clear. 
State substantive policy should be implemented through state law, 
properly interpreted, not by unauthorized federal common law. 
 
 
 266. Most provisions of the first eight amendments to the federal Constitution are incorporated 
against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The restrictions on 
appellate review of jury verdicts that were at issue in Gasperini are among the few exceptions. See 
Morris B. Hoffman, The Court Says No to “Incorporation Rebound,” 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 818, 831–
32 (2009) (reviewing the state of incorporation at that time). 
 267. Here, I am taking as given the Gasperini Court‘s conclusion that the New York law at issue 
was substantive for RDA purposes and that no Federal Rule applied; the Seventh Amendment is the 
only federal law in play. In the course of attempting to apply a state law conceded to be substantive, it 
is of course appropriate to consider legislative intent. Doing so does not conflict with taking a 
wholesale approach to the validity of the Federal Rules. 
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CONCLUSION 
Semtek and Gasperini each resulted in the unwarranted exercise of 
federal judicial discretion rather than a straightforward choice between 
state and federal law. However, the Supreme Court‘s creative energy on 
Erie questions has not yet infected the lower courts, and both Semtek and 
Gasperini can still be confined to their fairly narrow circumstances. The 
split in Shady Grove indicates that the Supreme Court remains poised 
between two paths: either ending Phase Three and returning to the 
conceptual structure of Phase Two, or else continuing with Phase Three‘s 
pattern of idiosyncratic accommodation of idiosyncratic state policies. 
This Article has shown that the Phase-Three approach is unnecessary on 
its own terms. The approach appears to be motivated largely by a sense 
that special accommodations are necessary to protect substantive state 
policy interests—the very interests that Erie itself vindicated. This 
motivation is misplaced. Case-by-case modification of federal procedural 
law is not necessary to protect states‘ democratically chosen policies. 
Rather, uniform federal procedure will allow states to formulate 
substantive policy with knowledge of the procedures through which that 
policy will be enforced and will encourage state lawmakers to act openly 
through the substantive law rather than manipulate outcomes with special 
procedures. Shady Grove should therefore mark the end of Erie‘s Third 
Phase. 
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